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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 40 1995 NUMBER 4
THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION OF A NATIONAL
PRODUCTS LIABILITY STATUTE OF REPOSE
© STEPHEN J. WERBER*
Editor's Note:
Subsequent to the date that this article was finalized, both
Houses of Congress approved a Conference Committee version of
H.R. 956 including a fifteen year statute of repose for products
liability claims. The Senate approved the Bill, by a vote of 59-40,
on March 21, 1996. The House approved the Bill, by a vote of
259-158, on March 29, 1996. President Clinton has indicated
that he will veto this Bill. Based on the votes in both Houses, it
does not appear that this veto can be overridden.
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I. INTRODUCTION
T ORT reform legislation, with emphasis on products liability
concerns, has been a primary focus of both the defense and
plaintiffs' bars since the 1970s. These efforts have been strenuously
lobbied, both for and against, by such groups as the Association of
Trial Lawyers of America, the American Bar Association, the insur-
ance industry and various manufacturing organizations. Congress
has also considered articles and testimony provided by members of
various law faculties.'
From early efforts to legislate various forms of statutes of re-
pose and damages limitations, the thrust has moved to the need for
broader based legislation. The current political climate, including
the philosophy expressed in the Republican "Contract with
America," makes clear that these efforts will result in national prod-
ucts liability legislation. Pending federal legislation,2 which in-
cludes a statute of repose, represents the apex of legislative efforts
to reduce the impact of strict liability in tort and other perceived
excesses of the existing tort compensation system.3
Lost in the overwhelming urge to modify existing law is the
apparent absence of legislative concern for the constitutionality of
many of the proposed provisions. 4 Despite the work of a few
1. See witness list contained in HOUSE COMM. ON COMMERCE, COMMON SENSE
PRODUCT LIABILrrY REFORM ACT, H.R. REP. No. 63, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I
(1995) (hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 63].
2. THE COMMON SENSE PRODUCT LIABILITY AND LEGAL REFORM ACT OF 1995,
H.R. 956, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) [hereinafter H.R. 956]; THE PRODUCT LIA-
BILITY FAIRNESS ACT OF 1995, S. 565, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) [hereinafter S.
565]. Questions regarding THE ATrORNEY ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 1995, H.R. REP.
No. 988, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), are beyond the scope of this Article.
3. Regrettably, this federal legislation does not provide comprehensive prod-
ucts liability reform. Full reform would, among other things: provide a revised
definition of strict liability and defect with focus on risk-benefit analysis, eliminate
the hindsight test, create a uniform comparative fault system which rejects joint
and several liability, eliminate multiple imposition of punitive damages arising
from a single design defect, and modify Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
to include products liability cases. The RESTATEMENT OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY (Ten-
tative Draft No. 2, 1995) addresses some of these concerns.
4. For example, discussion of the constitutionality of the Senate's Product Lia-
bility Fairness Act was limited to the congressional power to legislate and preempt
the field and to conclusory statements regarding some specific provisions. SENATE
986 [Vol. 40: p. 985
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respected authors, relatively little scholarly literature addresses con-
stitutional concerns, especially those centered on a national statute
of repose. 5 Little judicial concern was paid to the constitutionality
of commerce-based statutes of repose,6 but this cannot be said of
similar tort-based statutes of repose.
Constitutional issues arise in regard to many aspects of tort and
products liability reform legislation. 7 This article argues that stat-
utes of repose are unconstitutional, with emphasis on open courts
COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, PRODUCT LIABILITY FAIRNESS
ACT, S. REP. No. 69, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 25-29, 35-41 (1995) [hereinafter S. REP.
No. 69]. The Report's analysis of preemption merely recognized the power of
Congress to act. Id. A conclusory discussion of the Supreme Court's due process
analysis in regard to punitive damages was provided. Id. at 35 & n.120. Despite
extensive discussion of the Act's statute of repose, no attention was given to the
potential constitutional problems its adoption would create. Id. at 35-41. Discus-
sion of possible constitutional considerations is notably absent from both H.R. REP.
No. 63, supra note 1, and HOUSE COMM. ON RULES, PROVIDING FOR THE CONSIDERA-
TION OF H.R. 956, THE COMMON SENSE LEGAL STANDARDS REFORM ACT OF 1995,
H.R. REP. No. 72, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 72].
5. Francis E. McGovern, The Variety, Policy and Constitutionality of Product Liabil-
ity Statutes of Repose, 30 AM. U. L. REv. 579 (1981);JerryJ. Phillips, An Analysis of
Proposed Reform of Products Liability Statutes of Limitations, 56 N.C. L. REv. 663 (1978).
For a more recent analysis focused on the history, philosophy and substance of
open courts provisions, see David Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 TEMP. L. Q.
1197 (1992).
6. See U.C.C. § 2-725 (1977). This is a statute of repose for it demands that
actions governed by Article 2 of the U.C.C. be brought "within four years after the
cause of action has accrued," but defines accrual as "when the breach occurs, re-
gardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach." Id. at § 2-
725(1)-(2). Section 2-725(2) goes on to state:
A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that
where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods
and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the
cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been
discovered.
Id. at § 2-725(2). By pinning what initially appears as a traditional statute of limita-
tions period to a time-specific event, this section becomes one of repose.
Courts have consistently upheld such provisions against constitutional attack
in the commercial context. See, e.g., Basham v. General Shale Prods. Corp., 989
F.2d 491 (4th Cir. 1993) (stating that West Virginia statute of limitation is not
violative of Equal Protection Clause); Sheehan v. Morris Irrigation, Inc., 460
N.W.2d 413 (S.D. 1990) (stating that state constitution's open courts provision is
not violated by sales statute of limitations); cf. Davidson Lumber Sales, Inc. v.
Bonneville, Inc., 794 P.2d 11 (Utah 1990) (holding section unconstitutional when
applied to personal injury action).
7. This is not to say that tort reform, including products liability reform, is not
necessary. Reform is necessary and can be accomplished in a manner fully conso-
nant with the Constitution. Most provisions of the pending legislation are consti-
tutional. In subsequent articles the author hopes to address, and support, other
provisions of the proposed legislation which raise a constitutional dimension.
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or right to remedy (open courts) 8 and equal protection 9 provisions.
These issues reflect economic concerns at both federal and state
legislative levels that seek to advance strongly perceived public pol-
icy. These concerns, in turn, affect substantial substantive rights.
Freedom from personal injury, the right to life and safety, reflects
more than the mere economic concerns of either the injured party
or the product manufacturer. The ability to seek redress for such
harm includes a substantive right of considerable magnitude. The
influence of these factors could play a significant role in determin-
ing the constitutionality of the proposed federal legislation. Posed
differently, public policy plays both an express and inherent role in
the application of constitutional principles to tort reform legisla-
tion. For example, public policy concerns led the Florida Supreme
Court to conflicting results as to the validity of a statute of repose. 10
8. An "open court" or "right to remedy" constitutional provision, as its name
implies, is a mandate that aggrieved parties have a right to access the judicial sys-
tem to vindicate wrongs. The precise wording differs from state to state. Typical
wording includes: "[a]ll courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done
him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of
law, and shall have justice administered without denial or delay." OHIO CONST. art.
I, § 16. Similarly, the Rhode Island Constitution states:
[e]very person within this state ought to find a certain remedy, by having
recourse to the laws, for all injuries or wrongs which may be received in
one's person, property, or character. Every person ought to obtain right
and justice freely, and without purchase, completely and without denial;
promptly and without delay; conformably to the laws.
R.I. CONST. art. I, § 5.
9. A due process argument has been utilized by some courts to analyze various
statutes of repose, particularly those concerning medical malpractice. See, e.g.,
Garcia v. La Farge, 893 P.2d 428 (N.M. 1995) (holding statute violated substantive
due process rights of persons whose causes of actions accrued shortly before three
year statute had run); Gaines v. Preterm-Cleveland, Inc., 514 N.E.2d 709 (Ohio
1987) (holding medical malpractice statute of repose unconstitutional as applied
to adult medical malpractice litigants who did not have adequate time to file ac-
tions). In regard to statutes of repose, courts have addressed equal protection
concerns far more often than due process concerns. The similarity of applicable
standards makes it unlikely that a due process attack would succeed where an
equal protection argument failed. One observer has commented that "no law reg-
ulating social or economic matters has been invalidated by the Supreme Court" on
due process grounds since 1937. D. Don Welch, Legitimate Government Purposes and
State Enforcement of Morality, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv. 67, 72. For these reasons, discus-
sion of due process issues will be limited.
10. In Pullum v. Cincinnati, 476 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1985), the court affirmed
summary judgment, as to result only, based on the products liability statute of re-
pose. Id. at 659 (citing FLA. STAT. ch. 95.031(2) (1982)). The court receded from
the earlier decision in Battilla v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 392 So. 2d 874 (Fla.
1980), which had ruled that an earlier version of the statute violated the state con-
stitution's open courts provision. Pullum, 476 So. 2d at 659. The court, recogniz-
ing the public policy concerns, upheld the twelve year repose period by rejecting
an equal protection challenge. Id. The statute of repose was later repealed. Doe
v. Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc., 614 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1993).
[Vol. 40: p. 985
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This article will look to state and federal decisions in an effort to
comprehensively review the complex constitutional issues raised.
II. STATUTES OF REPOSE
A. State Concerns
A statute of repose is a form of statute of limitations that runs
from a point in time which disregards the date of injury. Such stat-
utes often run from the date a product is sold rather than the date
that the product's alleged defect caused injury or death. Such stat-
utes can, at times, cut off a right of action before the injured party
is either (a) injured, or (b) becomes aware of the relationship be-
tween an injury and its cause. The contrasting nature of these limi-
tations is simply that a true statute of limitations begins to run when
a person discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, the exist-
ence of a claim through violation of a legal right" whereas a statute
of repose runs from a fixed date or event.12 A prerequisite for the
validity of both a statute of limitations and a statute of repose is that
their specified time periods allow an injured party a reasonable
time to commence an action after a statutory period is either short-
ened or enacted. If the pending national legislation follows the
Senate version of the statute of repose, with its one year transitional
period, this principle will be met.13
The United States Supreme Court made clear that all claim-
ants are entitled to a reasonable period of time in which to bring
suit. The logic of Wilson v. Iseminger14 has been utilized by state
courts in support of decisions voiding statutes of repose but has not
been considered in the context of federal legislation. In Wilson, the
Court stated:
11. This definition assumes the existence of a discovery rule.
12. See, e.g., Spilker v. City of Lincoln, 469 N.W.2d 546, 548 (Neb. 1991) (de-
fining statute of repose). The distinction was recognized and accurately described
in Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) as:
Statutes of repose ... are different from statutes of limitations, although
to some extent they serve the same ends .... A statute of limitations
requires a lawsuit to be filed within a specified period of time after a legal
right has been violated or the remedy for the wrong committed is
deemed waived. A statute of repose bars all actions after a specified pe-
riod of time has run from the occurrence of some event other than the
occurrence of an injury that gives rise to a cause of action.
Id. at 672 (citations omitted). For this and other reasons, the conclusion that stat-
utes of repose are "on balance ... ill advised" is well taken. Phillips, supra note 5,
at 675.
13. H.R. 956, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 109(C) (1995) (Senate amended)
[hereinafter H.R 956 (Senate amended)].
14. 185 U.S. 55 (1902).
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[i]t may be properly conceded that all statutes of limita-
tion [s] must proceed on the idea that the party has full
opportunity afforded him to try his rights in the courts. A
statute could not bar the existing rights of claimants with-
out affording this opportunity; if it should attempt to do
so, it would not be a statute of limitations, but an unlawful
attempt to extinguish rights arbitrarily, whatever might be
the purport of its provisions. 15
Consistent with the need for a reasonable time, many state statutes
of limitations are modified by "discovery" rules which toll the appli-
cable statute of limitations until an aggrieved party either knows, or
reasonably should have known, that his or her injury was the result
of another's negligence or defective product.16
Many products, such as asbestos, allegedly cause disease only
after the passage of a lengthy incubation or latency period. The
ability to determine the cause of teratogenic birth defects may not
exist for years after birth and some products, such as diethylstilbes-
trol (DES), ingested during pregnancy, manifest no actual harm
until the child reaches puberty or adulthood. If the cause of action
accrues at the time of exposure (direct or in utero), rather than the
time of manifestation of the disease, a claim could be barred by
either the absence of a discovery rule or by the presence of a statute
of repose. In either case, the bar comes into effect before the in-
jured party has the knowledge necessary to file an action.
Typical judicial treatment of repose questions is predicated on
a balancing of interests, similar to those that support traditional
statutes of limitations, against those of equity and common sense.
A frequent starting point is the premise that there is something
manifestly unjust, perhaps immoral, in precluding a personal injury
cause of action before it can arise. There is relatively little concern
15. Id. at 62. For a discussion of the ramifications of this language, see infra
notes 91-125 and accompanying text.
16. Several leading decisions have created a common law discovery rule. See,
e.g., Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 371 A.2d 170 (N.H. 1977); O'Stricker v.Jim Walter
Corp., 447 N.E.2d 727 (Ohio 1983); accord Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949);
Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1975); Louisville
Trust Co. v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 580 S.W.2d 497 (Ky. 1979); Pierce v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 464 A.2d 1020 (Md. 1983); see also ALA. CODE § 6-2-3
(Supp. 1990); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.2 (West Supp. 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 52-577a(e) (West Supp. 1990); D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-311 (Supp. 1990); IND.
CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5 to -5.5 (West Supp. 1995); Miss. CODE ANN. § 15-1-49(2)
(Supp. 1990); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-224 (Reissue 1985); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28.01.1-
02(4) (Supp. 1989); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.10 (Anderson 1994); OR. REV.
STAT. § 30.907 (1989); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-103(b) (1994); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-249(4) (Michie Supp. 1990).
[Vol. 40: p. 985990
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with precluding commercial contract-based liability, in part be-
cause, at least in theory, the parties can bargain for an appropriate
time frame or warranty terms. No such power, theoretical or real,
exists when a consumer purchases a retail product.
In Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co.,17 the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire evaluated the competing policy interests at a relatively
early time in the development of the discovery rule. 18 This case
involved a claim that the use of an oral contraceptive caused the
plaintiff to become legally blind. 19 The applicable six year statute
of limitations for personal injury actions had run, but the court de-
nied the defendant's motion for summary judgment.20 After a re-
view of the competing policies, the court relied upon a traditional
support for the imposition of strict liability: the manufacturer is in
the better position to control the dangers posed by its products. 21
Despite its emphasis on defendant's status as a drug manufacturer,
the court's reasoning applies with equal force to a variety of miner-
als, chemicals and products that cause observable injury only after
passage of a substantial period of time. Such substances and prod-
ucts include asbestos, chromium, DES, Agent Orange, various ter-
atogens, estrogens, pesticides and herbicides.
The ultimate rationale for the court's decision lies in principles
ofjustice, fairness and morality. "It is manifestly unrealistic and un-
fair to bar a tort suit before the injured party has an opportunity to
discover that he has a cause of action.... at least in a case in which
the defendant has not demonstrated that the delay has been preju-
dicial to him."22 Similar reasoning has led other courts to the same
17. 371 A.2d 170 (N.H. 1977).
18. Id. at 176-77.
19. Id. at 171.
20. Id. at 177. New Hampshire law provided that "personal actions may be
brought within six years after the cause of action accrued, and not afterwards," but
no definition of "accrued" was set forth in the statute. Id. at 172 (quoting N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 508:4 (Supp. 1975)).
21. Raymond, 371 A.2d at 176.
22. E.g., id. at 177 (citation omitted). Similar concerns with basic fairness per-
vade decisions invalidating other forms of statutes of repose, such as for improve-
ments to real property. Brennaman v. R.M.I. Co., 639 N.E.2d 425 (Ohio 1994);
Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D. Co., 225 N.W.2d 454 (Wis. 1975). This concern
has also arisen in medical malpractice cases. McCollum v. Sisters of Charity of
Nareth Health Corp., 799 S.W.2d 15 (Ky. 1990). In McCollum, the court
recognized:
McCollum could not recover until a cause of action existed. Proof of
damage is an essential part of his medical malpractice cause of action.
Such proof was not available to him until 1985, when he first discovered
his injury. Yet the legislature, through the five-year cap in KRS
413.140(2), would require McCollum to do the impossible-sue before
HeinOnline  -- 40 Vill. L. Rev. 991 1995
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result.2 3
The constitutionality of the discovery provisions contained in
Ohio law were challenged in Burgess v. Eli Lilly & Co.24 where the
plaintiff could not proceed with her claim unless the statute's dis-
covery rule was invalid for failure to include DES within its purview.
The court found that the two year statute of limitations was trig-
gered when a plaintiff learned that she possibly had a DES related
injury.2 5 Noting the difference between knowing that one has such
an injury and knowing that one may have such an injury, the court
concluded that the statute, as applied, violated the open courts
clause of the Ohio Constitution. 26
The court observed that the open courts clause "would not al-
low a plaintiff's claim to be extinguished before it accrued, that is
before the plaintiff had knowledge of her injury."27 Further, "it
only makes sense that government cannot begin to regulate the
time in which a person has to bring a claim for an injury until the
potential claimant knows both that she has an injury and the cause
thereof."28 Thus, the reasoning that demands a discovery rule simi-
larly demands rejection of a statute of repose.
The open courts provisions of state constitutions, found in a
he had any reason to know he should sue. This is antithetical to the pur-
pose of the open courts provision in the Kentucky constitution.
Id. at 19.
23. See, e.g., Perkins v. Northeastern Log Homes, 808 S.W.2d 809 (Ky. 1991).
The court in Perkins applied such principles to allow suit against various parties
arising from the use of a wood preservative which allegedly led to the onset of non-
Hodgkin's lymphoma. In Perkins, exposure began in 1977, but initial symptoms did
not appear until 1986. Id. at 810-11.
24. 609 N.E.2d 140 (Ohio 1993). By this date, the applicable Ohio statutes
had been amended to include a provision that:
[a] cause of action for bodily injury which may be caused by exposure to
diethylstilbestrol . . . including exposure before birth, arises upon the
date on which the plaintiff learns from a licensed physician that he has an
injury which may be related to such exposure, or upon the date on which
by the exercise of reasonable diligence he should have become aware that
he has an injury which may be related to such exposure, whichever date
occurs first.
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.10 (Anderson Supp. 1993).
25. Burgess, 609 N.E.2d at 144.
26. Id. at 141 (citing OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16). For further discussion of the
Ohio Constitution, see supra note 8.
27. Id. at 141-42 (citing Hardy v. VerMeulen, 512 N.E.2d 626 (Ohio 1987),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988)).
28. Id. at 142. The court also noted that the statute violated plaintiff's right
to due process. Id. As a result, the court, relying upon O'Stricker v. Jim Walter
Corp., 447 N.E.2d 727 (Ohio 1983), applied a common law discovery rule to per-
mit this claim to proceed. Burgess, 609 N.E.2d at 143; see also Liddel v. SCA Servs.,
635 N.E.2d 1233 (Ohio 1994) (applying common law discovery rule to claim of
chlorine induced cancer).
992 [Vol. 40: p. 985
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majority of the states2 9 and having no express federal analog, are a
primary focal point for attacks upon the constitutionality of statutes
of repose. Perhaps the earliest federal judicial recognition of a sim-
ilar concept is found in Marbury v. Madison3 ° where, in a discussion
of executive branch power, Chief Justice Marshall observed that
"[t] he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of
every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he
receives an injury."31 The opinion further stated that "where a spe-
cific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the
performance of that duty, it seems equally clear that the individual
who considers himself injured has a right to resort to the laws of his
country for a remedy."32 The ramifications of this language, when
applied to a statute of repose, are discussed below. 33
An initial thrust of open courts provision claims is often predi-
cated on the time factor. Several such cases have been brought in
regard to medical malpractice repose provisions that call for analy-
sis similar to that which applies to products liability provisions. In
one leading case, involving allegedly improper surgical procedures,
the court upheld an open courts provision attack by observing that
the statute, which limited the rights of minors, "unconstitutionally
locks the courtroom door before the injured party has had an op-
portunity to open it. When the Constitution speaks of remedy and
injury to person, property, or reputation, it requires an opportunity
granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."3 4 A
statute of repose, by both definition and application, deprives an
injured party of any means to bring suit regardless of the substan-
tive validity of the claim. Whether posed in terms of a medical mal-
practice related injury or an injury caused by a defective product,
the result is the same and is equally repugnant to concepts of fair
play.
In its discussion of the conflict between statutes of repose and
29. As noted in Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985),
thirty-seven states had open courts provisions similar to that of Utah in 1985. Id. at
674 (citing McGovern, supra note 5, at 615 n.218). By 1992, thirty-nine states were
reported as having some form of open courts provision. Schuman, supra note 5, at
1201 and n.25.
30. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
31. Id. at 163.
32. Id. at 166. Although a manufacturer's duty to provide a reasonably safe
product differs from the duty discussed in Marbury, the principle remains
unchanged.
33. For a discussion of the implications of Marbuy, as applied to a statute of
repose, see infra notes 92-125 and accompanying text.
34. Hardy v. VerMeulen, 512 N.E.2d 626, 628 (Ohio 1987), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 1066 (1988).
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open courts provisions, the Supreme Court of Utah in Beny v. Beech
Aircraft Corp.35 concluded that a six year products liability and tort
statute of repose violated the open courts provision of the Utah
Constitution.3 6 Rejecting the line of state decisions upholding such
statutes, the court observed: "the cases holding products liability
statutes of repose constitutional under state open courts or reme-
dies provisions have all but read those constitutional provisions out
of their respective constitutions, at least insofar as they provide sub-
stantive, as opposed to procedural, protections."3 7
The Berry court specifically found that the statute did not rea-
sonably and substantially advance its stated purpose.38 Analytically,
the statute was deemed unreasonable and arbitrary in that: (1) the
time frame had no correlation to the type of product or its useful
life; (2) there was an absence of evidence of a substantial increase
in strict liability actions; (3) there was an absence of indicators that
such a statute would lower insurance costs; and (4) the effect would
likely reduce incentives for the manufacture of safer products. 39
Other state supreme courts have utilized state due process or
equal protection grounds to invalidate statutes of repose.40 In
Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,4 1 the Supreme Court of New Hamp-
shire used reasoning applicable to both the open courts and due
process clauses. In what may be the most piquant of the decisions,
this court observed:
35. 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985). Another line of cases has upheld other forms
of repose statutes against claims of violation of open courts provisions. See, e.g.,
Blaske v. Smith & Entzeroth, Inc., 821 S.W.2d 822 (Mo. 1991) (en banc); and cases
cited in the Appendix.
36. Bery, 717 P.2d at 686 (holding that statute of repose violates state consti-
tution's open courts provision). The Supreme Courts of Alabama, Arizona, Rhode
Island and South Dakota have reached similar results; however, a majority of state
courts have upheld the statutes. See Appendix (setting forth products liability stat-
utes of repose and decisions directly or indirectly addressing their
constitutionality).
37. Berry, 717 P.2d at 678.
38. Id. at 683. A due process principle is implicit in the court's reasoning and
could have served as a basis for the decision.
39. Id. at 681-83.
40. Shibuya v. Architects Hawaii Ltd., 647 P.2d 276 (Haw. 1982) (invalidating
statute of repose on equal protection grounds); Gaines v. Preterm-Cleveland, Inc.
514 N.E.2d 09 (Ohio 1987) (invalidating statute of repose on equal protection
and due process grounds); Mominee v. Scherbarth, 503 N.E.2d 717 (Ohio 1986)
(invalidating statute of repose on due process grounds); Broome v. Truluck, 241
S.E.2d 739 (S.C. 1978) (invalidating statute of repose on equal protection
grounds); Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572 (Utah 1993) (holding that statute violated
uniform operation of laws provision of state constitution).
41. 464 A.2d 288 (N.H. 1983).
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The unreasonableness inherent in a statute which
eliminates a plaintiff's cause of action before the wrong
may reasonably be discovered was noted by Judge Frank in
his dissent in Dincher v. Marlin Firearms Co.... in which he
condemned the "Alice in Wonderland" effect of such a
result:
"Except in topsy-turvey land, you can't die before you
are conceived, or be divorced before ever you marry... or
miss a train running on a non-existent railroad. For sub-
stantially similar reasons, it has always heretofore been ac-
cepted, as a sort of logical 'axiom,' that a statute of
limitations does not begin to run against a cause of action
before that cause of action exists .... -42
State courts that have not addressed a products liability statute
of repose, either because no such provision exists in that state or
because the issue has not yet reached the courts, have often ad-
dressed similar statutes in other areas. The Supreme Court of
Ohio, after determining that the conversion of an existing facility
into a titanium metals plant was an improvement to real property,
had to deal with a statutory provision that precluded tort actions
against the designers and engineers of such improvements if
brought more than ten years after completion of the construction
services. 43
In reconsidering the effect of the open courts provision of the
Ohio Constitution, the court overruled an earlier decision and held
that a statute, which denies a party a reasonable time to enter the
courthouse to seek compensation after an accident and deprives a
claimant of a right to a remedy before that claimant is aware of
injury, violates the terms and meaning of the state constitution. 44
In essence, the government cannot deny claimants an opportunity
to present their claims at a" 'meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner.' ,,45
42. Id. at 295 (quoting Dincher v. Marlin Firearms Co., 198 F.2d 821, 823 (2d
Cir. 1952)).
43. Brennaman v. R.M.I. Co., 639 N.E.2d 425, 427-29 (Ohio 1994) (reviewing
OHio REv. CODE § 2305.131 (Supp. 1994)). This statute had previously been held
constitutional in Sedar v. Knowlton Constr. Co., 551 N.E.2d 938 (Ohio 1990).
44. Brennaman, 639 N.E.2d at 430; accord Burgess v. Eli Lilly & Co., 609 N.E.2d
140 (Ohio 1993).
45. Burgess, 609 N.E.2d at 142 (quoting Gaines v. Preterm-Cleveland, Inc., 514
N.E.2d 709, 716 (Ohio 1987)). The Supreme Court of Ohio ignored Gaines when
Sedar was decided. Sedar, 551 N.E.2d at 644-49. The Burgess court also noted a
possible ethics problem for lawyers forced to choose between filing an action
995
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This reasoning has considerable merit. Although both courts
and lawyers can accept the logic of barring an action before it
arises, it can be done only with a somewhat large degree of con-
cern. The inherent unfairness grabs at one's throat. Were the pur-
poses of such statutes supported by empirical data, it would be
easier to accept the logic of the legislature as a valid reflection of
sound policy. There is logic and fairness in the idea that, some-
where along the continuum of time, liability must end. Together
with data to support such a stopping point, a well-drafted statute of
repose would have substantial merit.46
Despite this possibility, the problems created by open-ended
litigation potential are, nevertheless, outweighed by the benefits
and need for such actions. True products liability reform would
provide manufacturers with adequate protection and destroy the
need for repose provisions.47 Manufacturers are well aware that de-
fects in their products can cause harm until final disposal of the
product. No single time frame can accurately reflect the normal
use life or safe use life of all products. Defects cause injuries in a
random and haphazard manner without regard to the victim or the
year. The "long tail" problems of insurance coverage are soluble.
Computerized record keeping is available to even small manufac-
turers so that their design, research, testing, quality control and any
other efforts directed toward production of safe products mini-
mizes the threat of lost proofs.
As the practical problems related to claims brought many years
after a product has entered into commerce are soluble, the ques-
tion of the propriety of a statute of repose becomes one of policy.
The overall purposes and policies that form the foundation of strict
liability law are fostered by allowance of suit within a reasonable
time after a defect-caused injury occurs, regardless of product
age.48 Both the reasoning and the inherent policy decisions that
bar a claim before it arises are deeply flawed. Proper application of
before they are able to make all assertions in good faith or having a potentially
valid claim barred. Burgess, 609 N.E.2d at 142-43.
46. Such statutes would.incorporate both a discovery rule and a special provi-
sion for latent defects that cause immediate harm. For example, a safety device
such as an airbag may not be called upon to serve its function until many years
after sale of the motor vehicle. Together these provisions would provide relief
both for immediate harm caused by latent defects and for situations involving a
latent manifestation of illness.
47. Subject areas for true products liability reform are listed at supra note 4.
48. A statute of repose pegged to each manufactured product's useful safe life
could overcome this problem provided that the manufacturer gave adequate no-
tice of the designed useful safe life. For some examples of state provisions taking
this approach, see infra note 67.
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law, reasoning and policy establish that a statute of repose contra-
venes state constitutional open courts provisions and state equal
protection mandates.
It is, nonetheless, true that a number of states have upheld
their state repose statutes against constitutional attack. 49 Should
federal legislation become law, state constitutional provisions to the
contrary would fall. Thus, it is important to understand the reason-
ing of the courts that have upheld statutes of repose against consti-
tutional attack50 and consider how this reasoning could be applied
to federal legislation.
A good indicator of the rationale for upholding such a federal
statute of repose is found in Alexander v. Beech Aircraft Corp.51 In
Alexander, plaintiffs filed personal injury and wrongful death actions
on February 13, 1986 that arose from a plane crash of February 18,
1984.52 The actions were filed within the generally applicable two
year statutory period for such claims but well beyond the ten year
repose period, because the aircraft had been manufactured and
sold in 1967.5 3 Relying upon federal decisions and a leading Indi-
ana decision,54 the court rejected constitutional challenges to the
statute of repose. 55
The primary reasoning of the court was that an unaccrued
cause of action is not a vested property right protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment and, therefore, the Indiana legislature was em-
powered to impose such a limit.5 6 The lessening of the risk of loss
49. For a list of such states, see the Appendix.
50. See, e.g., Love v. Whirlpool Corp., 449 S.E.2d 602 (Ga. 1994) (holding that
statute of repose does not violate equal protection or due process rights); Olsen v.
J.A. Freeman Co., 791 P.2d 1285 (Idaho 1990) (holding that statute of repose does
not violate equal protection rights); Radke v. H.C. Davis Sons' Mfg. Co., 486
N.W.2d 204 (Neb. 1992) (holding that statute of repose does not violate equal
protection or due process rights); Sealey v. Hicks, 788 P.2d 435 (Or.), cert. denied,
Sealey v. Toyota Motor Corp., 498 U.S. 819 (1990) (holding that statute of repose
does not violate equal protection or due process rights).
51. 952 F.2d 1215 (10th Cir. 1991) (relying on Indiana law).
52. Id. at 1217-18.
53. Id. at 1222-23 (applying IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-20A-5 (1986)).
54. Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 418 N.E.2d 207 (Ind. 1981). In Dague, as in
Alexander v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 952 F.2d 1215 (10th Cir. 1991), the aircraft had
been manufactured and sold more than ten years prior to the occurrence. Dague,
418 N.E.2d at 209. Despite concern over the problem of latent defects and the
continuing duty to warn of such defects, the court found no violation of the Indi-
ana open courts provision. Id. at 213; accord Tetterton v. Long Mfg. Co., 332 S.E.2d
67 (N.C. 1985) (upholding six year statute of repose contained in N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 1-50(a) (6) (Supp. 1985) against gamut of constitutional attacks).
55. Alexander, 952 F.2d at 1225.
56. Id. at 1224-25. Several states' wrongful death acts require that a plaintiff
commence an action within a set time after death without regard to mitigating
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to manufacturers was deemed a legitimate purpose that should not
be contravened by the courts.5 7 The court further noted that prior
Indiana and federal decisions upheld the repose statute finding no
denial of due process, equal protection or deprivation of access to
the courts "in light of policy reasons for the statutes such as avoid-
ing the risks and cost of litigation to manufacturers after a lengthy
passage of time."58 Finding a rational basis for the statute, the court
held that summary judgment for the defendant manufacturer was
appropriate. 59
The arguments in favor of statutes of repose begin with the
essential premise that they do not bar a claim before injury occurs.
Absent an injury prior to the running of the statutory period, there
is no cognizable claim.60 Courts have utilized similar reasoning to
uphold the repose period of wrongful death acts that often com-
mence upon death without regard to knowledge, or lack thereof, as
to the cause of death in relation to a given product.6' The beguil-
ing logic of this approach has an appeal in that it supports what
may well be more appropriate reasons for such decisions. First, def-
erence to the separate functions of the judicial and legislative
branches is important:
"[P]olicy determinations concerning economic issues are
most properly made in the legislative arena where all the
factors surrounding a particular problem may be weighed.
circumstances. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 573.02(1) (West 1994); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2125.02(D) (Anderson 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-28(2) (1995).
These legislatively created actions can be limited without invading constitutional
rights. Shover v. Cordis Corp., 574 N.E.2d 457, 462 (Ohio 1991); Keaton v. Rib-
beck, 391 N.E.2d 307, 308-09 (Ohio 1979). Indeed, a legislature can "do away
entirely with wrongful death actions." Pitts v. Unarco Indus., Inc., 712 F.2d 276,
279 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1003 (1984) (citing Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S.
113, 134 (1876)).
57. Alexander, 952 F.2d at 1225 (citing Pitts, 712 F.2d at 280).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1225 & n.12.
60. A syllogism: personal injury or death, alone, cannot suffice as a basis of
recovery. Only the law gives a party the right to recovery. If the law provides no
means to recovery, there is no claim. Therefore, the fact of personal injury or
death is irrelevant. That the injury or death, if acted upon within the statutory
period, would be a basis for recovery is, ipso facto, also irrelevant. Similar circular
reasoning can be observed in contract law concepts regarding rescission and pre-
existing duty. See 1 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CoNTRAcrs § 186 (3d ed. 1952) (discussing
court's circular arguments for pre-existing duty and rescission).
61. Alexander, 952 F.2d at 1224-25. Note, however, that a state legislature that
creates a wrongful death action can limit the cause of action as it deems appropri-
ate. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 432 (1982) (citing Martinez
v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980)). Logan recognizes that the State "remains free
to ... eliminate its statutorily created causes of action altogether." Id.
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When the Legislature is properly concerned with balanc-
ing competing interests to ensure a stable market for the
manufacture of basic products and acts to do so by enact-
ing a statute of repose, our inquiry should end. Our Legis-
lature is at least as competent as this court in making
economic policy determinations."62
Second, such statutes shield manufacturers against open-ended lia-
bility created by allpwing claims for an indefinite period of time.
Such statutes, as recognized by the Model Uniform Product Liabil-
ity Act, create an actuarially certain date after which liability cannot
be assessed and eliminate tenuous claims for which evidence of de-
fect may be difficult to produce. Thus, the "long tail" problem is
negated. 63 A final, more questionable, claim is that open-ended lia-
bility reduces the development and marketing of new products. 64
The Supreme Court of Florida encapsulated the need for cer-
tainty and its benefits, a recognized objective of traditional statutes
of limitation, in a decision that conflicted with its prior rulings. In
upholding a products liability statute of repose against an equal
protection claim, the court stated that "[t] he legislature, in enact-
ing this statute of repose, reasonably decided that perpetual liability
places an undue burden on manufacturers, and it decided that
twelve years from the date of sale is a reasonable time for exposure
62. Tetterton v. Long Mfg. Co., 332 S.E.2d 67, 75 (N.C. 1985) (quoting Ken-
nedy v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 471 A.2d 195, 206 (R.I. 1984) (Murray, J., dissent-
ing)); accord Gibson v. West Virginia Dep't of Highways, 406 S.E.2d 440, 444-46 (W.
Va. 1991).
63. Tetterton, 332 S.E.2d at 73.
64. See, e.g., Kochins v. Linden-Alimak, Inc., 799 F.2d 1128, 1138 (6th Cir.
1986) (rejecting equal protection challenge to Tennessee products liability statute
of repose, TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-103 (1980), because state has rational basis in
preventing liability from discouraging product development and marketing).
Pharmaceutical companies delayed marketing certain vaccines until they gained a
degree of federal protection. See Swine Flu Act, Pub. L. No. 94-380, 90 Stat. 1113
(1976) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 247(b) (j)-(1) (1976), repealed by Pub. L. No. 95-626,
92 Stat. 3551, 3574 (1978)); The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-1 to -34 (1988)).
However, on a more global basis, this assertion has little, if any, substantiation and
appears to rest more on opinion than fact. Moreover, deterrence of the develop-
ment of unsafe products is a benefit to both manufacturers and society. Products
liability concerns may delay marketing to complete adequate research and testing
which assures safe products. Such a delay is merited. Delay is not necessarily sy-
nonymous with an absence of development. Perhaps the best known example of
delay which prevented marketing is the thalidomide disaster. See Myron L. Marlin,
Comment, Treatment INDS: A Faster Route to Drug Approval?, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 171,
177 & n.49 (1989) (noting harmful effects of thalidomide as sedative for pregnant
women and Food and Drug Administration (FDA) reluctance and, later, refusal to
approve drug). The refusal of the FDA to approve the drug prevented thousands
of birth defects in the United States. Id.
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to liability for manufacturing of a product."65
Many products do have a useful safe life. Delineating that life
would assist courts seeking to dismiss cases where the facts illustrate
a use beyond that time. In light of the complexity of useful safe life
issues,66 including such factors as establishing product specific time
frames, the scope of the duty to warn as to its existence and modifi-
cations in the state of the art, it is deceptively easy to resolve such
issues by a prophylactic approach: the legislature simply imposes a
generally applicable time frame that obviates the problem. 67
Finally, the immunity conferred by a statute of repose can itself
be deemed a legal right. Such reasoning was applied to deny recov-
ery to a plaintiff who was injured after falling into a mixing
machine. The action was barred by an applicable products liability
statute of repose. In rejecting all constitutional attacks, the court
held that "immunity afforded by a statute of repose is a right which
is as valuable to a defendant as the right to recoverjudgment is to a
plaintiff; the two are but different sides of the same coin."68 Of
course, this is a "right" which did not exist until the legislature cre-
ated it, well after recognition of the underlying right to a remedy.
These arguments, the absence of a constitutionally express fed-
eral open courts provision and other factors suggest that enactment
of federal legislation may lead to a new and different set of constitu-
tional parameters. These parameters require a true application of
equal protection standards without excessive judicial deference to
unsupported legislative findings. The principles of equal protec-
tion can remain stable while yielding a result different from that
anticipated by those seeking a national statute of repose.
65. Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc., 476 So. 2d 657, 659 (Fla. 1985); cf. Battilla v.
Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 392 So. 2d 874, 874-75 (Fla. 1980) (McDonald,J., dissent-
ing) (supporting proposition that subjecting manufacturers to liability for injury
whenever caused by products places "an onerous burden on the industry" so that
"liability should be restricted to a time commensurate with the normal useful life"
of products).
66. See Robert A. Van Kirk, Note, The Evolution of Useful Life Statutes in the Prod-
ucts Liability Reform Effort, 1989 DuKE L.J. 1689. Some states have attempted to
define useful safe life or incorporate its principles into law. See, e.g., ARK. CODE
ANN. § 16-116-105(b)(c) (Michie 1979); IDAHO CODE § 6-1403(1) (a) (b) (1980);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3303 (1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.03 (West 1988); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 7.72.060 (West 1981).
67. This simplistic solution has a rational basis only if variations in useful safe
life are ignored.
68. Radke v. H.C. Davis Sons' Mfg. Co., 486 N.W.2d 204, 206 (Neb. 1992)
(quoting Spilker v. City of Lincoln, 469 N.W.2d 546, 548 (Neb. 1991)).
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B. Federal Concerns
1. Background
After thirteen years of debate, Congress will soon pass a federal
products liability law. Although no one can predict the ultimate
fate of congressional action, it is likely that federal legislation will
preempt products liability law in all states. H.R. 956, entitled The
Common Sense Product Liability and Legal Reform Act (Product
Liability Act), has been passed in the House.69 The Senate has
passed an amended version of the House Bill in lieu of S. 565, the
Product Liability Fairness Act (Product Fairness Act).70 Ajoint con-
ference committee will likely approve an act in 1996. Enactment
will raise several preliminary questions.
First, federal legislation, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, is
measured only against the mandates of the Constitution of the
United States. 71 The decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States and state court application of federal standards will govern
the application of the mandates for due process, equal protection
and trial byjury. State courts will be precluded from applying more
restrictive interpretations based on state constitution analogs.72
Second, the Interstate Commerce Clause provides Congress
with the authority to enact uniform products liability law.73 The
69. The House passed House Bill 956 on March 10, 1995. 141 CONG. REC.
H3027 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 1995).
70. The Senate passed House Bill 956 on May 10, 1995. 141 CONG. REc.
S6369 (daily ed. May 10, 1995).
71. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. "Having been enacted within the scope of power
delegated to the Federal Government, the Internal Revenue statutes are a part of
the supreme law of the land. If they are in conflict with State law, constitutional or
statutory, the latter must yield." United States v. Dallas Nat'l Bank, 152 F.2d 582,
585 (5th Cir. 1945), rev'd on other grounds, 164 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1947); see also
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (holding that state law that
conflicts with federal law is without effect); Local 174, Int'l Brotherhood of Team-
sters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102 (1962) (holding that "incompatible doc-
trines of local law must give way to principles of federal labor law"); Dice v. Akron,
Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952) (holding that federal law, not
Ohio law, governed validity of liability releases under Federal Employers' Liability
Act). A state court may apply only federal standards even when considering appli-
cation of Fourteenth Amendment equal protection to the validity of state law:
"when a state court reviews state legislation challenged as violative of the Four-
teenth Amendment, it is not free to impose greater restrictions as a matter of fed-
eral constitutional law than this Court has imposed." Minnesota v. Clover Leaf
Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 463 (1981) (citing Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719
(1975)).
72. Nevertheless, a division of reasoning and outcome can be anticipated un-
til specific precedent is set at the federal appellate level and ultimately by the
Supreme Court.
73. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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foundation for asserting this right to legislate is both self-evident
and statistically valid. Seventy percent of the goods manufactured
in a state are shipped out of that state.74 The House Bill includes a
series of findings and statements of purpose designed to guarantee
judicial approval of its power to enact such a bill. This Bill first sets
forth eleven findings ranging from an assertion that the civil justice
system has been perverted so as to abridge rights, create injustice
and destroy liberty,75 to recognition that the problems enunciated
are national in scope and require the national government to re-
move barriers to interstate commerce. 76
With this foundation, the House then specifies its purposes as
based on the need to promote the free flow of goods and services
and to lessen burdens on interstate commerce by: (1) creating uni-
form legal principles to provide a fair balance between users, manu-
facturers and sellers; (2) placing reasonable limits on damages over
and above actual damages; (3) ensuring the fair allocation of liabil-
ity; (4) reducing the cost of excessive litigation; and (5) providing
greater fairness, rationality and predictability to the justice system.77
This pattern has been used successfully in past statutes of vast im-
pact. 78 The findings make clear that products liability law has a
significant affect on, and relationship to, interstate commerce.
Though perhaps merely reflecting an uncanny grasp of the obvi-
ous, the findings are important as they will be laid against the law
and reasoning set forth in United States v. Lopez. 79
Although Lopez may represent a dramatic change in the
Court's view of congressional power under the Interstate Com-
merce Clause,80 nothing in its language suggests that the courts will
74. Product Liability Fairness Act, 1993: Hearings on S. 687 Before the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 95 (1994) (testimony
of Victor E. Schwartz) [hereinafter Hearings S. 687]. Congress has adopted this
figure. H. RIEP. No. 63, supra note 1, at 9. No indication is provided as to the
proportion of such "exported" goods between foreign and domestic markets.
75. H.R. 956, supra note 2, § 2(a)(1).
76. Id. § 2(a)(9), (10).
77. Id. § 2(b).
78. For example, the use of Findings and Purpose language has proved highly
useful in regard to the validity, application and interpretation of the Americans
with Disability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1990).
79. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995). In Lopez, the Court recognized that "as part of our
independent evaluation of constitutionality under the Commerce Clause we of
course consider legislative findings, and indeed even congressional committee
findings, regarding effect on interstate commerce [the issue before the Court]."
Id. at 1631.
80. From NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), until
Lopez, the Court upheld every congressional act reviewed against a charge that it
was insufficiently based on interstate commerce. Similarly, for a period beginning
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void the Product Liability Act for lack of a sufficient interstate com-
merce connection. Lopez reiterates the right of Congress to regu-
late channels of interstate commerce as well as its power to regulate
and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce. 81 The
Court also reiterates the right of Congress to regulate activities hav-
ing a substantial relation to interstate commerce.8 2 A products lia-
bility act, unlike the firearms statute voided in Lopez, has a
substantial and direct impact upon interstate commerce consistent
with any of the three recognized approaches. Lopez may open some
existing federal laws to constitutional challenge, but it should not
affect the validity of a national Product Liability Act.
8 3
Third, due to the Product Liability Act's express preemption
clauses,84 states will have to excise some existing law and will not be
permitted to freely develop their own law of products liability as to
any areas governed by the Act.8 5 Although the wording of the Sen-
ate and House Bills differ, their thrust is similar. To the extent that
there is a federal provision in the legislation, it is fully preemptive.
The use of express preemption language negates concerns as to
congressional intent and implied preemption. This language will
in the late 1930s and continuing into the 1970s, the Court struck down an eco-
nomic regulation on equal protection grounds in only one case, Morey v. Doud,
354 U.S. 457 (1957). This decision was overruled in New Orleans v. Dukes, 427
U.S. 297 (1976) (per curiam).
81. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629.
82. Id.
83. A respected commentator's suggestion that such a claim may be valid re-
quires too broad a reading of Lopez. Nevertheless, it is asserted that "[n]umerous
federal regulations might be invalidated as having too remote a relationship to
interstate commerce. In fact, the proposed federal legislation now pending in
Congress to reform medical malpractice law and products liability law may be con-
stitutionally vulnerable after Loper" Erwin Chemerinsky, Changing Course: Lopez
Limits Congressional Powers, 31 TRiAL 86, 89 (1995).
84. H.R. 956, section 101 provides, in part, that:
(a) Preemption: This title governs any product liability action brought
in any State or Federal court, on any theory for harm caused by a
product....
(b) Relationship to State Law: This title supersedes State law only to the
extent that State law applies to an issue covered by this title. Any issue
that is not governed by this tide shall be governed by otherwise applicable
State or Federal law.
H.R. 956, supra note 2, § 101. The Senate version, H.R. 956 section 102(B), takes a
similar approach. H.R. 956, supra note 13, § 102(b) (Senate amended).
85. Assuming all substantive provisions are enacted, the role of state courts
will be highly circumscribed. See H.R. 956, supra note 2, §§ 102-104 and 201-203.
State law could not conflict with these substantive provisions. Many areas that true
reform would address are left to the states. Even where state law remains control-
ling, many judgments would be substantially reduced due to the federal limitations
on damages.
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be applied by the federal courts consistent with its scope.86
These foundational points reveal two important core facts:
Congress can act in the area of products liability and can preempt
state law.87 Any attack upon perceived excesses in the federal act
will have to be predicated not on the power to act, but on the man-
ner in which that power is exercised. The focus now turns to the
proposed national statute of repose.
Subject to a limited number of exceptions, H.R. 956 contains a
statute of repose precluding any products liability action unless
commenced within fifteen years of the date of delivery of the prod-
uct to its first purchaser or lessee who was not engaged in the sale
or leasing of the product.88 A limited discovery rule is also pro-
86. See generally New York State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995) (holding ERISA's preemption provision
did not preempt New York statute because surcharges it required did not "relate
to" employee benefit plans); Freightliner Corp. v. Ben Myrick, 115 S. Ct. 1483
(1995) (holding National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act did not expressly
preempt state common law design defect claims); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
505 U.S. 504 (1992) (holding that Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
preemption clause limited to states mandating particular cautionary statements on
cigarette packages as in advertisements).
It is unlikely that a successful constitutional attack can be mounted based on
the concepts of federalism and the Tenth Amendment. Nevertheless, some, in-
cluding Professor Neil Vidmar, believe that such an attack will be made. Martha
Middleton, A Changing Landscape, 81 A.B.A. J. 56, 60 (1995) (quoting Professor
Vidmar). The amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST., art. I, § 3, cl. 3. But seeNewYork
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (finding Tenth Amendment violation in take
title clause of Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, 42
U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C) (1985)). The overall reasoning of the case is consistent
with congressional preemption of the products liability field pursuant to its power
to regulate interstate commerce. Cf New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 146-
47. The Product Liability Act does not appear to present the potential Tenth
Amendment issues raised by various National Health Care Plans. See generally Can-
dice Hoke, Constitutional Impediments to National Health Care Reform: Tenth Amend-
ment and Spending Clause Hurdles, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 489 (1994) (discussing
constitutional problem of national health care reform presented by Tenth
Amendment).
Despite the imposition of new and different law upon the states, an attack
predicated on the Ninth Amendment is also unlikely to succeed. This amendment
provides that: "[t] he enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST.
amend. IX.
87. Congress has preempted the realm of tort law where it affects interstate
commerce. See, e.g., The Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation
Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1988) (upheld in L'Hote v. Crowell, 286 U.S. 528
(1932)); The Federal Employer's Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988) (upheld
in In re Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912)).
88. As passed by the House, the statute of repose provides:
(a) GENERAL RULE-A product liability action shall be barred unless
the complaint is filed and served within 15 years of the date of delivery of
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vided. The Senate version contains a more limited provision which
provides for a twenty year repose period as to durable goods which
do not cause toxic harm.8 9 Durable goods are defined as goods
with a normal life expectancy of three or more years or those which
meet the depreciation allowance provisions of the Internal Revenue
Service and other criteria.90
The limited nature of the Senate provision, coupled with its
one year savings period, has two important effects. First, due to its
specific exclusions, it will apply to a substantially reduced number
of products such as manufacturing equipment, elevators and heat-
ing and cooling systems. Second, limiting the scope of application
and providing a reasonable period in which to file claims before the
twenty year bar takes effect reduces the likelihood of effective con-
stitutional attack.
2. Analysis: Absence of a Federal Open Courts Right
The United States Supreme Court will ultimately decide the
constitutional validity of a national statute of repose. When that
case comes before it, the Court will align itself with one of the com-
peting views recognized in the state courts. One approach could be
based on a determination that there is a federal right, equivalent to
state open courts provisions, which voids the repose statute. 91 Even
the product to its first purchaser or lessee, who was not engaged in the
business of selling or leasing the product or of using the product as a
component...
(b) EXCEPTION-Subsection (a)-(1) does not bar a product liability ac-
tion against a defendant who made an express warranty in writing as to
the safety of the specific product involved which was longer than 15 years,
but it will apply at the expiration of such warranty, (2) does not apply to a
physical illness the evidence of which does not ordinarily appear less than
15 years after the first exposure period, and (3) does not affect the limita-
tions period established by the General Aviation Revitalization Act of
1994.
H.R. 956, supra note 2, § 106.
89. H.R. 956, supra note 13, § 109(b) (Senate amended). The Senate version
of House Bill 956 provides for a two year statute of limitations with a discovery rule.
Id. § 109(a). Paragraph (b)(3) excludes motor vehicles, vessels, aircraft or trains
used primarily to transport passengers from the scope of the repose provision as
well as goods expressly warranted as to safety for more than twenty years. Id.
§ 109(b)(3). Paragraph (c) allows a one year savings period. Id. § 109(c)
90. H.R. 956, supra note 13, § 101(6).
91. The absence of an express constitutional provision does not negate the
existence of a constitutional right as well established in the judicial development of
privacy rights. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (establishing women's
qualified right to abortion as encompassed in right to privacy despite absence of
express constitutional provision); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(holding right to marital privacy is encompassed in penumbra of Bill of Rights
guarantees).
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if such an approach is not adopted, the Court should find such a
repose statute unconstitutional on equal protection grounds.
There are many reasons for concluding that constitutional re-
jection is the better reasoned approach. Three reasons stand out.
First, the principle that a claim can be negated before it arises,
though technically valid, is repugnant to basic concepts of fairness
and justice. Second, a prophylactic determination as to the useful
safe life of all products is inherently arbitrary. Third, even assum-
ing that there is some degree of insurance crisis, it does not justify a
statute of repose when there is little evidence that such a statute
either reduces the cost of insurance or makes such insurance more
readily available. In addition, for practical and business reasons,
the safety incentives of products liability law will prevail with or
without a statute of repose.
The potential for finding a federal open courts doctrine began
with Marbuiy v. Madison92 and was further developed a century later
in Wilson v. Iseminger.93 In Marbuiy, Chief Justice Marshall carefully
noted that civil liberty requires that every individual possess the
right to claim protection of the law when injured.94 The Wilson
court specifically held that a statute which bars claims before afford-
ing the right to bring such a claim is not a statute of limitations but
is an unlawful attempt to extinguish rights arbitrarily.95 In both
cases, the broad language relating to rights closely parallels open
courts provisions of state constitutions. This language implies an
equivalent federal right. The validity of this implication is, how-
ever, questionable.
The oft-quoted passage from Wilson, indicating that the law
precludes barring an action before a party has the opportunity to
bring it,96 must be taken in context. The context does not fully
support an open courts approach. The case involved a Penn-
sylvania law that imposed a twenty-one year statute of repose upon
the collection of ground rent and other charges upon real estate
with certain exceptions for recorded obligations, including judg-
ments. By its terms, the Act did not take effect until three years
92. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). For an introduction to the discussion of
Marbuiy's application to an open courts doctrine, see supra notes 30-33 and accom-
panying text.
93. 185 U.S. 55 (1902). For an additional discussion of Wilson, see supra notes
14-16 and accompanying text.
94. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 162.
95. Wilson 185 U.S. at 62.
96. Id. ("A statute could not bar the existing rights of claimants without af-
fording this opportunity; if it should attempt to do so, it would not be a statute of
limitations, but an unlawful attempt to extinguish rights arbitrarily.").
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after passage. The Court recognized that the theory of this reme-
dial act was "that upon which all statutes of limitation are based-a
presumption that, after a long lapse of time without assertion, a
claim.., is presumed to have been paid or released. This is a rule
of convenience and policy, the result of a necessary regard to the
peace and security of society."97 The Court went on to observe that:
Statutes of limitation are passed which fix upon a reason-
able time within which a party is permitted to bring suit
for the recovery of his rights, and which, on failure to do
so, establish a legal presumption against him that he has
no legal rights in the premises. Such a statute is a statute
of repose. Every government is under obligation to its citi-
zens to afford them all needful legal remedies; but it is not
bound to keep its courts open indefinitely for one who neglects or
refuses to apply for redress until it may fairly be presumed that the
means by which the other party might disprove his claim are lost
in the lapse of time.98
The Court was concerned with a statute of repose, but found
that its enactment and effect was a proper exercise of legislative
power.9 The issue then became whether the Court's qualifying
language, that focused on the equities and the loss of evidence
which are traditional statute of limitations concerns, 100 applies to a
products liability statute of repose. One can readily conclude that
products which cause the onset of illness only years after exposure
are outside the purview of such limiting language and are within
the broader right to remedy aspects of the decision. Due to the
absence of neglect or refusal to act, Wilson arguably precludes a re-
pose statute for toxic tort litigation. On the other hand, a repose
statute which applies to capital goods or products which simply fail
after the passage of many years could be within the purview of the
qualifying language even if the defect was latent. The pending fed-
eral repose provision, in both Houses, falls within the latter failure
mode category. 10 1
Even this view, mandating recourse only for latent illness, may
fail in light of the Court's discussion of whether the plaintiff had a
97. Id. at 60-61.
98. Id. at 62 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
99. Wilson, 185 U.S. at 62-63.
100. Id. at 62.
101. H.R. 956, supra note 2, § 106(a) (providing 15 year statute of repose);
H.R. 956, supra note 13, § 109(b) (1) (Senate amended) (providing for 20 year
statute of repose).
1007
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reasonable amount of time in which to bring suit. In Wilson, the
Court stressed that there was no vested right to sue in a contract
action any more than there was an unrestricted right to sue and
that:
[T] hey have no more a vested interest in the time for the
commencement of an action than they have in the form of
the action to be commenced;.., it is well settled that the
legislature may change [statutes of limitation] at its discre-
tion, provided adequate means of enforcing the right
remain.10 2
In this context, one can conclude that a fifteen or twenty year pe-
riod in which to commence an action is reasonable. Congress
could then determine that a product which causes no harm within
such a time frame is, by conclusive presumption, non-defective.
More recent decisions are consistent with the conclusion that
the Constitution does not incorporate an open courts right that
parallels the express provisions found in state constitutions. For ex-
ample, in 1992, the Supreme Court denied standing to conserva-
tionists and other environmental organizations in a decision which
also found that the injury alleged by these groups was not
redressable.10 3 This declaratory judgment action challenged regu-
lations promulgated pursuant to the Endangered Species Act. 104
In its analysis, the Court emphasized the limitations imposed
by separation of powers and made manifest that the remedy lan-
guage in Marbury must be narrowly circumscribed.105 "'The prov-
ince of the court . . . is, solely, to decide on the rights of
individuals.' "106 As there was an absence of concrete injury, no
case or controversy existed to permit the action to go forward.10 7 A
broader reading of Marbury could have permitted the Court to de-
termine that the Endangered Species Act carried an implicit right
of the people to demand its proper application and, therefore, to
find that a remedy had to be provided. Such an approach would
have paralleled an open courts provision. The opportunity for such
an approach existed through application of the Act's citizen-suit
provision. 108
102. Wilson, 185 U.S. at 63.
103. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
104. Id. at 557-58.
105. Id. at 576.
106. Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803)).
107. Id. at 571.
108. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1995). Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion
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Similarly, in the earlier case of Jett v. Dallas Independent School
District,10 9 the Supreme Court refused to create a damages remedy
broader than that provided by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 from the rights de-
clared in 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and held that "the express 'action at law'
provided by § 1983 for the 'deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,' provides the ex-
clusive federal damages remedy for the violation of the rights guar-
anteed by § 1981 when the claim is pressed against a state actor."110
The majority refused to imply an appropriate remedy despite a
strong dissent based on the remedies language of Marbury and
other decisions." 1 Even the dissent, however, relied on the exist-
ence of a substantive right." 2 Because a statute of repose is predi-
cated on the absence of such a right, even the dissent's approach
could not lead to an implied federal open courts right." 3
could logically extend to incorporate an open courts right. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 606
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163). Justice
Blackmun stated: "[i]n my view, '[t] he very essence of civil liberty certainly con-
sists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever
he receives an injury.'" Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Marbuy, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) at 163).
109. 491 U.S. 701 (1989).
110. Id. at 735. The Court has consistently taken a limited view of its decision
in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971), which granted a civil damages remedy against federal agents for violation
of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 397. This constricting approach was illustrated
in FDIC v. Meyer, 114 S. Ct. 996 (1994), where the Court refused to extend Bivens'
reasoning to an action against a federal agency despite a claimed violation of the
Fifth Amendment's taking clause. Id. at 999.
111. Jett, 491 U.S. at 742 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Justice
Brennan stated:
We have had good reason for concluding that § 1981 itself affords a cause
of action against those who violate its terms. The statute does not explic-
itly furnish a cause of action for the conduct it prohibits, but this fact was
of relatively little moment at the time the law was passed. During the
period when § 1 of the 1866 Act was enacted, and for over 100 years
thereafter, the federal courts routinely concluded that a statute setting
forth substantive rights without specifying a remedy contained an implied
cause of action for damages incurred in violation of the statute's terms.
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
112. See id. To this extent, the dissent is consistent with the Court's
observation:
[a] disregard of the command of the statute is a wrongful act, and where
it results in damage to one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted, the right to recover the damages from the party in
default is implied, according to a doctrine of the common law.
Id. (quoting Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1916)).
113. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 65 (1992). In
Franklin, the Court found an implied right to monetary damages for violation of
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688. Id. at 63-
65, 76. The holding was predicated, in part, on the importance of providing a
remedy as enunciated in Marbuy. Id. at 66. However, the Act involved provided
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Nor has Wilson v. Iseminger1 14 been construed to provide an
open courts right. The case history is largely limited to the applica-
tion of the Court's mandate that a party be provided with a reason-
able time in which to bring suit after a claim arises and the absence
of a governmental duty to keep courts open indefinitely.' 15 A
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decision pro-
vides ample illustration of the limited ramifications of Wilson.
In Banrick v. Celotex Corp.,' 16 the Fourth Circuit was called upon
to determine the validity of the North Carolina statute of repose
which, if applied, was a bar to plaintiff's action against a key de-
fendant predicated on injury allegedly sustained from asbestos ex-
posure. In upholding the statute against claims that it violated the
equal protection and open courts provisions of the North Carolina
Constitution, the court recognized that this was a repose statute.' 17
The court also recognized that the statute, coupled with an applica-
ble discovery rule, actually extended the time for many plaintiffs to
bring suit for injury which had a delayed manifestation.1 8 This
benefit eased the policy concerns that might otherwise have led to
an underlying statutory right which contained no express limitations as to the na-
ture of the remedy available. Id.
The Court specifically observed that "the question of what remedies are avail-
able under a statute that provides a private right of action is 'analytically distinct'
from the issue of whether such a right exists in the first place." Id. at 65-66 (cita-
tions omitted).
114. 185 U.S. 55 (1902).
115. See, e.g., Ockerman v. May Zima & Co., 27 F.3d 1151, 1155 & 1157-58
(6th Cir. 1994) (stating that it is necessary to provide plaintiff with reasonable time
in which to file suit); Hart v. United States, 910 F.2d 815, 818 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(holding that government is not required to keep its courts open indefinitely for
one who neglects to apply for redress); Hanner v. Mississippi, 833 F.2d 55, 57 (5th
Cir. 1987) (noting that plaintiff must be given reasonable time before his claim is
barred as untimely); Messere v. Murphy, 585 N.E.2d 350, 352 (Mass. App. Ct.
1992) (stating that all persons must be accorded full and ample time to commence
suit); Garcia v. La Farge, 893 P.2d 428, 433 (N.M. 1995) (noting that purpose of
statute of limitations is to protect defendants from stale claims and to provide ade-
quate time for person of ordinary diligence to pursue lawful claims).
116. 736 F.2d 946, 962-63 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that statute was bar to
plaintiff's action); accord Block v. North Dakota ex ret. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands,
461 U.S. 273, 287 (1983) (holding that North Dakota statute of repose does not
exempt states); Hart, 910 F.2d at 818 (upholding statute of repose for claims under
Federal Survival Benefit Plan); see also Colony Hill Condominium I Ass'n v. Colony
Co., 320 S.E.2d 273 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (upholding statute of repose that barred
claim of negligence in building construction, even before injury occurred), cert.
denied, 325 S.E.2d 485 (N.C. 1985).
117. Barwick, 736 F.2d at 952 (stating that because statute contained "outer
limit" provision beyond three year statute of limitation, ten year outer limit is not
conventional statute of limitation, but is statute of repose).
118. Id. at 955-56 (indicating that "[a]lthough a certain number of plaintiffs
will always have a problem with a statute of limitation or repose, this does not
mean that they have been denied a constitutional right").
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an opposite result.1 19
The court's decision in Barwick relied on Wilson for its equal
protection analysis that although government has an obligation to
provide citizens with needful remedies, it could also establish time
limits within which such remedies could be sought. 120 Thus, no
open courts violation existed in Barwick, despite the constitution's
mandate for "remedy by due course of law."12 1
Case law establishes that neither Marbury nor Wilson, individu-
ally or collectively, can be used to imply an open courts right. Be-
cause precedent fails to provide a sufficient foundation for such a
result,1 22 it must be concluded that no such federal right exists.
The absence of an express or implied federal open courts right
removes the judicial ability to strike down repose statutes on this
logical ground so often utilized by those state courts that have
struck down such statutes. If repose statutes are to be found uncon-
stitutional, the foundation for doing so will have to be found in
equal protection 12 -a foundation erroneously rejected by the ma-
119. Id. at 956-58 (noting that proper balance was struck between repose in
law and plaintiff's expanded rights under statute).
120. Id. at 955. The court also observed that statutes of limitation "affect the
remedy and not the right. They remove the court as a forum for enforcing the
right." Id. at 957. This reasoning would preclude application of the Marbuty rem-
edy language.
121. Id. at 958 (quoting N.C. CONST., art. I, § 18). Because the legislature has
the power to define the circumstances under which a remedy may be pursued, the
ultimate conclusion was readily achieved.
122. A line of Supreme Court cases focusing on due process and the right to a
hearing, as illustrated by Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982),
almost provides such a foundation. In Logan, the claimant's right to a hearing on
his wrongful termination claim was precluded by a failure of the State Fair Employ-
ment Practices Commission to schedule a fact-finding conference within the statu-
torily prescribed period. Id. at 424-25. Plaintiff prevailed because he had filed his
claim in a timely fashion and due process mandated that he had a right to be
heard. Id. at 434. The Court reasoned that the state-created substantive right
could not be precluded through application of a procedural rule beyond plain-
tiff's control. Id. at 434-35.
The parallel to a repose bar beyond control of an injured party is obvious.
The analog, hence the right of access claim, fails because in theory an injured
party has no property right when the injury arises after the repose period and, as
recognized by the Court, "[the State may erect reasonable procedural require-
ments for triggering the right to an adjudication, [including] statutes of limita-
tion." Id. at 437 (citation omitted).
123. A right founded in due process is untenable. Although the Due Process
Clause prohibits forcing a party to take the bitter (procedural rules that lead to a
deprivation of property) with the sweet (a state-created substantive right), this
principle requires the existence of a vested property right. Cleveland Bd. of Educ.
v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985). Property interests are "created and their
dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an in-
dependent source such as state law." Id. at 538 (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth,
1011
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jority of courts that have addressed the issue. 12 4 Perhaps the single
most important reason that these courts have erred in their analyses
is their failure to recognize that the right to seek a remedy is not
merely an economic issue. Rather, it is a significant substantive
right.125
3. Analysis: Introduction-Equal Protection
Traditional equal protection analysis has long been recognized
as an improper vehicle for the courts to judge the wisdom or logic
of legislative choices or as a means to allow the judiciary to act as a
superlegislature.12 6 Classifications which do not involve fundamen-
tal rights, nor proceed along suspect lines, are accorded a strong
presumption of validity and must be upheld whenever there is a
rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some
legitimate governmental purpose, even if the legislative body fails to
articulate those reasons. 127 If there is any reasonably conceivable
set of facts that can provide a rational basis for the classification,
that classification is to be upheld unless that basis is overcome by
evidence submitted by the party challenging the classification. 12 8
In addition, the legislation's validity is not negated by the absence
of "mathematical nicety" or the existence of an imperfect fit be-
tween the ends and the means. 12 9 Nevertheless, to withstand an
equal protection challenge fhe legislation must have "some footing
in the realities of the subject addressed by the legislation."1 30
Recent Supreme Court decisions defining the standards to be
408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). For a discussion of other reasons supporting the ab-
sence of a due process approach, see supra note 9.
124. For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 185-220 and accompany-
ing text. Relevant decisions are gathered in Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Validity and
Construction of Statute Terminating Right of Action for Product-Caused Injury at Fixed
Period After Manufacture, Sale or Delivery, 25 A.L.R. 4th 641, §§ 3-6 (1983 & Supp.
1995).
125. The Supreme Court of Utah, relying on Wilson, recognized "the funda-
mental obligation of government to provide reasonable remedies for wrongs
done." Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 679 (Utah 1985).
126. Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 315 (1993) (stating "that rational-
basis review in equal protection analysis" is not license for courts to judge wisdom,
fairness or logic of legislative choices) (quoting FCC v. Beech Comm., Inc., 508
U.S. 307 (1993)).
127. Id. The court notes that a statute is presumed constitutional, and the
burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negate every conceiv-
able basis that might support it. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. The court points out that problems of government are "practical"
ones which justify, if not require, illogical and unscientific accommodations. Id.
130. Id.
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applied in resolution of equal protection claims reveal that the
meaning of this basic protection has been undergoing a subtle met-
amorphosis.131 One result has been a substantial body of academic
literature dissecting trends, analyzing decisions, drawing definitions
and anticipating the Court's future direction.' 32 This article seeks
only to identify the proper standards and apply them to products
liability statutes of repose. Despite the number of cases holding
that equal protection standards are not violated by the application
of a statute of repose, the better approach, reflected in the reason-
ing of a smaller yet significant number of courts, is to find that stat-
utes of repose do violate equal protection.13 3
Regardless of the applicable standard of review and degree of
deference granted to the legislative enactment, the rationale for
131. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2482 (1995) (noting that
while basic principle of Equal Protection Clause is straightforward, its application
raises difficult issues); Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2300 (1995) (recognizing
that states may, under certain circumstances, create liberty interests which are pro-
tected by Due Process Clause); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097,
2117 (1995) (adhering to strict scrutiny standard of review, but emphasizing that
standard is strict, not fatal); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1421
(1994) (holding that under Equal Protection Clause gender is unconstitutional
proxy for juror competence and impartiality); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306
(1993) (holding that release of alien juveniles to close relatives, while detaining
those without close relatives does not violate Equal Protection Clause); and the
various approaches discussed and distinguished within the majority, plurality, con-
curring and dissenting opinions of these cases. The precise meaning and applica-
tion of equal protection has always been murky. "Our opinions in these areas [due
process and equal protection] often are criticized, with justice, as lacking consis-
tency and clarity." Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 443 & n* (1982)
(Powell, J., concurring).
132. See generally Eugene Doherty, Equal Protection Under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments: Patterns of Congruence, Divergence and Judicial Deference, 16 OHIo N.U. L.
REv. 591, 591 (1989) (defining equal protection review under Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments and comparing standards of review); Michael Klarman, An
Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REv. 213, 215 (1991) (pro-
viding historical evolution of modem equal protection in order to facilitate under-
standing of conceptual shifts that have occurred over time); Richard E. Levy,
Escaping Lochner's Shadow: Towards a Coherent Jurisprudence of Economic Rights, 73
N.C. L. Rxv. 329, 329 (1995) (noting that Supreme Court has become increasingly
more conservative over last twenty years and examining Court's economic rights
jurisprudence over this period); Jane Rutherford, The Myth of Due Process, 72 B.U.
L. REv. 1, 4-5 (1992) (arguing that all due process decisions, whether substantive
or procedural, amount to value choice between whether government action is arbi-
trary or adequately justified); Bernard H. Siegan, Majorities May Limit the People's
Liberties Only When Authorized To Do So by the Constitution, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 309,
309-10 (1990) (adhering to originalist interpretation of Constitution and support-
ing individualist position in doing so).
133. At least twenty states have enacted products liability statutes of repose, of
which six have been held unconstitutional. Three, including two of the judicially
held invalid statutes, have been repealed. The remaining statutes have either been
upheld or have not yet been specifically addressed by the courts. See Appendix.
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passage of a statute of repose plays the primary role in ascertaining
that statute's constitutional validity. Because the proposed new stat-
ute of repose is national, the findings of Congress will become a
focal point. These findings include: (1) abuse of the civil justice
system; (2) an overly litigious nation; (3) arbitrary damage awards
and allocations of liability; (4) inconsistent law among the several
states; (5) withdrawal of products from the market due to the first
four factors plus liability costs which result in higher prices; (6) the
adverse impact upon industry and small business; (7) the under-
mining of America's ability to compete in the international market;
(8) increased insurance costs; (9) the inability of state law to ad-
dress these national problems; (10) a constitutional duty to remove
barriers to interstate commerce; and (11) the need to restore ra-
tionality, fairness and predictability to the system.' 3 4 In addition,
repose statutes serve the objectives of traditional statutes of limita-
tions in regard to parties who have slept on their rights, stale claims
and related problems of witness availability and loss of evidence.
These objectives provide no additional basis for the imposition of
statutes of repose. In fact, the traditional objectives contained in
findings one through four and nine through eleven apply with
equal force to the entire civil justice system and particularly the tort
compensation system. Finding eight also applies to the general tort
system, but according to Congress has specific products liability ap-
plication. Yet Congress gives significant attention to only one seg-
ment of the civil justice system-products liability.13 5
Many of these findings are consistent with those proffered at
the state level.' 3 6 If the congressional findings are either inaccurate
or applicable with equal force to other aspects of the tort compen-
sation system, a strong argument of constitutional violation exists.
The more specific question, however, is whether a statute of repose,
as distinct from the overall legislation, promotes one or more of the
proposed legislative purposes.13 7
134. H.R. 956, supra note 2, § 2(a)(1)-(11).
135. Id. Title III addresses Biomaterials Suppliers, but biomaterials are within
the broad purview of products liability law. Id.
136. The primary focus of the state legislatures was on the capacity of manu-
facturers to gain insurance at a reasonable rate, avoid the long-tail problem, and
provide a degree of immunity from litigation that would aid long term corporate
planning. It was also theoretically possible that a repose statute would aid corpo-
rate solvency and thereby provide a greater likelihood of recovery to claimants who
brought suit within the allowed time frame.
137. The purposes, set forth in H.R. 956, supra note 2, § 2(b), are to provide
uniform principles of products liability law, place reasonable limits on damages,
ensure fair allocation of liability, reduce litigation costs and delay and establish
greater fairness and predictability in the civil justice system. Absent the specific
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The congressional purposes encompass both products liability
and the civil justice system. With the possible exception of cost re-
duction, they have no direct correlation to statutes of repose. The
multiple, indeed schizophrenic, objectives of the proposed bills
cannot be met by substantively addressing only the limited portion
of torts law encompassed by products liability.
To truly accomplish the stated objectives, a full tort reform, or
at least full products liability reform, would be necessary. However,
the proposed legislation does not provide even full products liabil-
ity reform, for it leaves open core issues.138 Had the Act, in either
the House or Senate version, addressed the totality of issues appro-
priate for congressional attention, it could have been viewed as cre-
ating a new federal right that would negate virtually all
constitutional questions other than those surrounding the question
of whether Congress had such authority.13 9 However, since the leg-
islation addresses only a few specific elements of products liability
law, this line of analysis cannot be applied. This nibbling at the
corners of products liability reform raises a broader constitutional
dimension.
4. Equal Protection: Application and Overview
The broad language of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
states that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws," applies with equal force to both
the United States and each individual state. 140 Although the Four-
teenth Amendment does not directly apply to acts of the United
reference to products liability law, these purposes are as readily appropriate for
general tort reform. See also H.R. RFP. No. 72, supra note 4, at 10-12.
138. For further discussion of the issues that are not addressed by proposed
federal legislation, see supra note 3.
139. There is no pervasive federal common law of products liability. The
Supreme Court has adopted principles of strict liability in tort for resolution of
products liability claims arising under admiralty jurisdiction. East River S.S. Corp.
v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 865 (1986). If the Act created a new
right, the Congress would have the power to limit that right just as state legislative
bodies have the power to impose a repose limitation on legislatively created wrong-
ful death actions. See supra notes 57 and 62 and accompanying text.
The Ohio Supreme Court in McAuliffe v. Western States Import Co., 651
N.E.2d 957 (1995), reversed the lower court's decision that the Ohio Products
Liability Act had created a new cause of action therebyjustifying application of the
statutory right statute of limitations rather than the shorter personal injury limita-
tion. Id. at 959. The court agreed with the principle of law, but found it inapplica-
ble on the facts. Id. at 960-61. But see Hanson v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319,
325-26 n.14 (N.D. 1986) (finding no distinction between legislatively and judicially
created rights).
140. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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States, the Supreme Court has made clear that the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment carries with it equal protection con-
cepts that are indistinguishable from those guaranteed in the Four-
teenth Amendment.14 1  Historically, three broad categories of
equal protection review have been applied by the Court: (1) strict
scrutiny, (2) intermediate scrutiny, and (3) rationality or the ra-
tional basis test. Throughout the history of equal protection adjudi-
cation, the core principle has been the "simple command that the
Government must treat citizens as individuals, not as simply compo-
nents of a racial, religious, sexual or national class." 142
Strict scrutiny provides the most exacting level of review. It ap-
plies to either classifications based on a suspect class-race, alien-
age or national origin-or to fundamental rights. 143 This standard
requires that the classification be necessary to advance a compelling
government interest and be narrowly tailored to further that goal.
Repose statutes affect members of all races, alienage and national
origin and do not limit a fundamental right. For these reasons,
strict scrutiny is inapplicable to review the proposed national statute
of repose.144
Intermediate scrutiny, on the other hand, developed as a mid-
dle ground between the rigid demands of strict scrutiny and the
141. SeeAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2106-08 (1995).
The Court applied strict scrutiny to test the validity of a federal law promoting
affirmative action in contracting. Id. at 2101. The Court ruled that to uphold this
racial classification, it, "like those [laws] of a State, must serve a compelling govern-
mental interest, and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest." Id. Justice
Stevens noted this "congruence," but asserted that the protections offered by the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are "not always coextensive." Id. at 2125 & n.8
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
142. Miller v.Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2486 (1995) (utilizing strict scrutiny to
void voting district reflecting race-based decision making) (citations and internal
quotes omitted).
143. See, e.g., City of Richmond v.JA. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989)
(reaffirming highly suspect nature of classifications based on race, alienage or na-
tional origin); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440
(1985) (stating that general rule gives way when statute classifies by race, alienage
or national origin); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33, 44
(1973) (holding that because Texas' system of public school finance did not impli-
cate classification of race, alienage or natural origin, it is inappropriate candidate
for strictjudicial scrutiny); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-
53 n.4 (1938) (stating that in order for higher judicial standard to be applied,
there must be showing that legislative judgment did not rest upon some rational
basis).
144. At least one court has applied strict scrutiny analysis to a medical mal-
practice statute of repose based on analysis of its state constitution. Kenyon v.
Hammer, 688 P.2d 961, 970-71 (Ariz. 1984) (en banc); see also Richardson v. Car-
negie Library Restaurant, Inc., 763 P.2d 1153, 1161 (N.M. 1988) (applying inter-
mediate scrutiny test to invalidate statutory cap).
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deferential approach of rational basis. This principle of interpreta-
tion, requiring that the classification serve an important govern-
mental objective and bear a substantial relationship to that
objective, has been applied mainly to gender and illegitimacy
claims. 145 From an applications vantage point, the Supreme Court
has often utilized some form of intermediate scrutiny in lieu of
either rational basis or strict scrutiny to areas outside of gender and
illegitimacy. These applications have been murky in defining the
basis for using intermediate scrutiny as opposed to either of the
other tests, but the cases clearly establish that some form of middle
level review was applied.
Intermediate scrutiny was applied to determine the validity of a
statute limiting the rights of children of illegal resident aliens to a
public education despite the absence of both a suspect class and a
fundamental right.1 46 The Court's post-1970s decisions in alienage
cases can be viewed as consistent only if the Court had utilized an
intermediate scrutiny standard. 147 Similarly, an intermediate stan-
dard was applied to strike down a durational residency requirement
for voting. 148 A standard short of strict scrutiny, but beyond ra-
145. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)
(holding that parties seeking to uphold statutes classifying individuals on basis of
gender "must carry burden of showing 'exceedingly persuasive' justification for
such classification") (quoting Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981));
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (holding "classifications by gender must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives"); Reed v. Reed, Adm'r, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971)
(invalidating provision of Idaho probate code due to different treatment of appli-
cant based on sex, after subjecting such classification to strict scrutiny). In J.E.B. v.
Alabama ex relT.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994), the Court reiterated this standard and
reaffirmed that in gender discrimination matters the use of gender based classifi-
cations "require 'an exceedingly persuasive justification' in order to survive consti-
tutional scrutiny." Id. at 1425 (citations omitted) (holding that Equal Protection
Clause precluded use of gender based peremptory challenges).
Some state courts have applied an intermediate review to statutes of repose.
See, e.g., Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 830 (N.H. 1980) (applying standard more
rigorous than rational basis to medical malpractice action); accord Heath v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 464 A.2d 288, 294 (N.H. 1983) (applying more rigid test than
rational basis because right to recover for personal injuries qualifies as important
substantive right); Hanson v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319, 325 (N.D. 1986)
(applying intermediate standard because right to recover for personal injuries con-
stitutes important substantive right).
146. SeePlyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223-24, 226 (1982) (holding that because
state cannot justify discriminatory policy with compelling state interest, policy is
unconstitutional).
147. See JOHN E. NOWAK AND RONAL D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
§ 14.12, at 702 (4th ed. 1991) (outlining classifications based on alienage).
148. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 334-43, 360 (1972) (holding that
State's failure to assert sufficient relationship between stated interest and dura-
tional residence requirements demonstrates unconstitutionality of policy).
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tional basis, was applied in the review of a state statute that made it
a felony for a parent to abandon a child and leave the state but only
a misdemeanor when the parent remained in the state. 149 This
confusing level of scrutiny was applied despite the fact that limita-
tions on interstate travel are traditionally subject to strict scrutiny
review.
Statutes of repose apply with equal force to both males and
females and involve no aspect of illegitimacy and, therefore, as cur-
rently defined intermediate scrutiny is not appropriate for equal
protection review of a statute of repose according to the Supreme
Court. Some state courts have, however, recognized that the right
to recover for personal injury is a significant substantive right re-
quiring application of intermediate scrutiny or an equivalent ap-
proach. 150 If the Supreme Court concludes that the right to seek
redress is one of considerable importance, similar to that of educa-
tion, alienage, residency requirements for voting or interstate
travel, it could readily apply intermediate scrutiny to statutes of
repose.
The logic of the state court decisions is compelling for it is
consistent with Wilson and with the Supreme Court's apparent will-
ingness to extend the application of intermediate scrutiny. Inter-
mediate scrutiny should be adopted by the federal courts because it
is the proper standard of review for determining the constitutional
validity of statutes of repose. The standard permits courts to give
appropriate deference to the legislature while allowing a more thor-
ough exploration of the relationship of the statute to its purported
purposes.
The third approach, that of rational basis, has been almost uni-
formly applied in both state and federal courts to ascertain the va-
lidity of various forms of statutes of repose. This approach
mandates only a determination that the legislation be rationally re-
lated to a legitimate public purpose. 151 Unlike strict scrutiny, ra-
149. SeeJones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 422-26 (1981) (finding that when stat-
ute does not infringe on individual's fundamental rights, state need not apply least
restrictive or most effective means to achieve legitimate ends).
150. See, e.g., Spilker v. City of Lincoln, 469 N.W.2d 546, 548 (Neb. 1991)
(quoting Givens v. Anchor Packing, 466 N.W.2d 771, 773-74 (Neb. 1991)); Heath
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464 A.2d 288, 295 (N.H. 1983); Hanson v. Williams
County, 389 N.W.2d 319, 325 (N.D. 1986).
151. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442
(1975) (holding that because mental retardation is not quasi-suspect class legisla-
tion, it only has to be rationally related to legitimate government purpose);
Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 357-58 (1979) (upholding paternity statute under
rationally related test because it did not invidiously discriminate against any class).
Some state courts have analyzed cases within this category by application of an
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tional basis review does not require the legislature to articulate the
purpose or rationale supporting its classification. 15 2 Despite the
likely absence of such a requirement, the findings and purpose lan-
guage of H.R. 956 is directed to the constitutional imperative of
establishing a legitimate public purpose. A statutory classification
which "neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes funda-
mental constitutional rights," is subject to this deferential standard
of review.153 This standard may, regrettably, continue to be viewed
as the appropriate measure of repose statute constitutionality.
a. Intermediate Scrutiny
A leading case utilizing intermediate scrutiny to invalidate a
statute of repose on state equal protection grounds is Hanson v. Wil-
liams County.15 4 In Hanson, the plaintiff was injured by an allegedly
defective multi-ton earth packer in August 1983,1 5 and he filed suit
less than one year after the injury was sustained. 156 The machine
had been manufactured in November 1963 and sold to an initial
purchaser in April 1964.157 The North Dakota statute of limitations
contained a repose provision insulating the machine manufacturer
from suit "unless the injury, death, or damage occurred within ten
years of the date of initial purchase for use or consumption, or
"arbitrary, capricious and invidious" standard so that the legislation is invalid only
if arbitrary and lacking a reasonable purpose or reflecting no appropriate public
policy. See, e.g., Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 225 N.W.2d 454, 458 (Wis.
1975) (stating that only if classification is arbitrary and has no reasonable purpose
or reflects no justifiable public policy will classification be held violative of constitu-
tional guarantees of equal protection).
152. Miller v.Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2490 (1995) (citing Heller v. Doe, 509
U.S. 312, 315 (1993)). Nevertheless, the Court has reviewed state interests as ar-
ticulated by the state. In Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307
(1976), the Court observed that a mandatory retirement statute "rationally furthers
the purpose identified by the State." Id. at 314 (footnote omitted). Similarly, in
New Orleans v. Dukes, the Court found that "[t]he city's classification rationally fur-
thers the purpose which... the city had identified as its objective in enacting the
provision [protecting the French Quarter]." 427 U.S. 297, 304 (1976) (per
curiam). This approach does not appear to create an affirmative obligation upon
the state to articulate a government objective. But see infra notes 221-22 and ac-
companying text, for a discussion of the existence of such a duty.
153. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 309 (1993). Such a
statutory classification must be upheld against an equal protection challenge if
there is any "reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational
basis for the classification." Id.
154. 389 N.W.2d 319, 325, 328 (1986) (invalidating N.D. CENT. CODE 28-01.1-
02 (1991) based on intermediate scrutiny test). There is no significant difference
between the North Dakota and United States Equal Protection Clauses.
155. Id. at 320.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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within eleven years of the date of manufacture of a product."1 5 8
The court noted that the supporters of this provision focused on
the affordability of products liability insurance while opponents
questioned whether the insurance objective could be met on a state
level and voiced fairness concerns. 159
The court proceeded to outline the three traditional standards
of review for equal protection noting that the intermediate stan-
dard, though less clearly defined than strict scrutiny or rational ba-
sis, required a " 'close correspondence between statutory
classification and legislative goals.' "160 The court correctly ob-
served that intermediate scrutiny still required a presumption of
legislative validity and that the presumption is conclusive absent a
clear showing of constitutional violation that does not exist merely
because a statute is not all-embracing.1 61 Relying on Heath v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co.,1 62 the court recognized that a statute of repose cre-
ates a question significantly more important than mere economic
concern. The Hanson court found:
While there are economic consequences for manufactur-
ers and their insurers underlying the legislation in ques-
tion, we believe our focus must be on the individuals
affected. We are unwilling to view human life and safety as
simply a matter of economics. Therefore, we agree with
the New Hampshire Supreme Court that the right to re-
cover for personal injuries is an important substantive
right.163
Facing such an important substantive right, the court reasoned
that intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate level of review. 16
Turning to whether the statute could withstand such review, the
court delineated two key elements. First, the statute created a clas-
sification between persons injured by products within the repose
158. Id. at 320 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.1-02 (1991)).
159. Id. at 320-21.
160. Id. at 323 (quoting Arnesan v. Olsen, 270 N.W.2d 125, 133 (N.D. 1978)).
161. Id. at 324 (citing Patch v. Sebelius, 320 N.W.2d 511, 513 (N.D. 1982)
(applying intermediate scrutiny standard to question of equal protection)).
162. 464 A.2d 288 (N.H. 1983).
163. Hanson, 389 N.W.2d at 325 (emphasis added) (citing Heath v. Sears,
Roebuck, & Co., 464 A.2d 288, 294 (N.H. 1983)).
164. Id. In Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Haggerty, 416 So. 2d 996 (Ala.
1982), a products liability repose statute was reviewed, "more strictly than normal,"
a form of heightened scrutiny, in an open courts' analysis. Id. Similarly, a form of
heightened scrutiny was applied when analyzing and voiding the Utah products
liability repose provision under an open courts provision. Berry v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 680 (Utah 1985).
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period and those injured by identical products at any later time. 165
Second, the classification was predicated on specific legislative be-
liefs and objectives. 166 For example, the legislature believed that
safe use over time was an indicia of non-defect and that difficulties
in defending actions brought a substantial time after manufacture
or sale had to be obviated.1 67 In addition, the legislature consid-
ered resolution of the insurance problem and the need for long
term planning of manufacturers' affairs.' 68
The court concluded, even granting that the legislature be-
lieved there was an insurance crisis, that a repose statute had no
capacity to meet these goals.1 69 Rather, the court stated that such a
statute "arbitrarily den [ied] one class of persons important substan-
tive rights to life and safety which are available to other persons."'' 7 0
Because a close correspondence between the statute and its goals
was not present, the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause. 7 '
The court's reliance upon Heath was significant and appropri-
ate. Heath involved a products liability repose statute enacted
largely in response to a perceived insurance crisis.' 72 Despite pas-
sage of the statute, the New Hampshire legislature created a special
commission to ascertain whether the provisions enacted would im-
165. Hanson, 389 N.W.2d at 326-27.
166. Id. at 327. The court stated that the question therefore becomes,
"whether or not there is a close correspondence between th[e] statutory classifica-
tion [the first key element] and the legislative goals [the second key element] that
would justify the classification." Id.
167. Id. (citing Department of Commerce, Model Uniform Products Liability
Act, § 110(b) (1) (1979)). The Model Uniform Products Liability Act outlines a
threefold rationale in support of products liability statutes of repose:
First, the fact that a product has been used safely for a substantial period
of time is some indication that it was not defective at the time of delivery.
Second, if a product seller is not aware of a claim, the passing of time may
make it difficult to construct a good defense because of the obstacle of
securing evidence .... The third rationale is that persons ought to be
allowed, as a matter of policy, to plan their affairs with a reasonable de-
gree of certainty.
Department of Commerce, Model Uniform Products Liability Act, § 110(b) (1)
(1979).
168. Department of Commerce, Model Uniform Products Liability Act,
§ 101(c).
169. Hanson, 389 N.W.2d at 328. The court reasoned that some rational basis,
other than mere economic interest, must be advanced for the selection of the
period of years. Id.
170. Id. at 328. The court noted that "property rights" may often be affected
by arbitrary time periods. When human life and safety is at stake, however, more is
required for a justification than mere economics. Id.
171. Id.
172. Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464 A.2d 288, 293 (N.H. 1983). This
"products liability law" was enacted to protect manufacturers who supposedly were
unduly burdened by rapidly rising insurance rates. Id.
HeinOnline  -- 40 Vill. L. Rev. 1021 1995
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
prove insurance availability and affordability.173 In December 1979,
the commission reported the difficulty in estimating the effect of
the repose statute on the availability or cost of products liability in-
surance.1 74 The commission also noted that while these problems
had eased, "it seem [ed] unlikely that this relaxation [was] attributa-
ble to the enactment of RSA 507-D." 175 The inability to relate the
repose statute to the improvement in the insurance market was
partly caused by the end of the national "panic" rise in rates, tend-
ing to show that state legislation was not a stabilizing influence. 176
With this foundation in place, the court then determined the
proper standard of review.
The Heath court's determination was based on its continued
belief that "although not a fundamental right, 'the right to recover
for personal injuries is . . . an important substantive right.' "177
Thus, the court based the statute's validity on whether the classifica-
tion was "reasonable" and rested "upon some ground of difference
having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legisla-
tion."1 78 This call for a determination of whether the repose provi-
sions were substantially related to resolution of the insurance crisis
is an application of intermediate scrutiny.
The Heath court concluded that the statute was neither reason-
able nor substantially related to the objective of the legislation and,
therefore, that it violated both the state and federal Equal Protec-
tion Clauses.1 79 Simply, the classification was not supportable in its
creation of a class of persons whose right to bring suit was termi-
nated before the right arose, while another class of similarly injured
persons could bring suit based on the identical product defect.180
To focus on when a product was manufactured or introduced into
commerce was, and remains, an improper alternative to allowing
suit within a proscribed time after injury has been sustained.,
The court's analog to the statute creating a "topsy-turvey land"
would have been greatly appreciated by Alice as she wandered
through Wonderland. 82
173. Id.
174. Id. at 293-94.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 294.
177. Id. (citation omitted).
178. Id. (citation omitted).
179. Id. at 295-96.
180. Id. at 296.
181. Id. at 295.
182. Id.
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There can be no honest debate as to whether a claim predi-
cated on injury caused by a product is any less a common law right
of action than a cause of action based in any other tort. The need
for legislative reform has arisen not because products liability is a
new creature of the law,183 but because the liability theory has
evolved from negligence to strict liability with its product oriented
focus. The right to bring such an action must be recognized as
more than an economic right. To foreclose products liability plain-
tiffs, a small group within the vast array of tort plaintiffs, from a
right of action before that right arises creates an unreasonable clas-
sification that violates the Equal Protection Clause.
The most effective means of guaranteeing fairness to products
liability plaintiffs, together with all other tort plaintiffs, is to review
statutes of repose with a discerning eye rather than abject defer-
ence to the legislative will. 184 Such a result is attainable by applica-
tion of intermediate or heightened scrutiny. Such a standard can
be invoked at the federal level by the simple expedient of ex-
panding the scope of intermediate scrutiny to include claims predi-
cated on an important substantive right. Gender and illegitimacy
claims represent precisely such a categorization. The Supreme
Court has, in practice if not in clearly enunciated theory, extended
these categories to include groups who suffer from discrimination
in aspects of education, alienage or residency. It is time to add per-
sonal injury victims to this growing list of persons entitled to the
protection of intermediate scrutiny. If Congress is truly concerned
with fairness in products liability litigation, it must consider fairness
to claimants and manufacturers alike. A statute of repose rejects
the balance that fairness demands. Intermediate scrutiny should,
and hopefully will, result in a determination that the proposed fed-
eral repose provision is constitutionally infirm.
b. Rational Basis
Since 1984, over thirty decisions involving the repose statutes
of thirteen states have applied the rational basis test to determine
183. Strict liability had been applied to a variety of products well before its
broader application in the 1960s. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d
436, 440-43 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (citing numerous cases that ap-
plied strict liability). Justice Traynor's seminal concurrence foreshadowed the first
broad-based strict liability decision, Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d
897 (Cal. 1963).
184. The minimal application of "unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious" lan-
guage within the context of rational basis due process review reflects "extreme
deference" to the legislative will. Welch, supra note 9, at 72.
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the outcome of challenges based on the Equal Protection Clause.18 5
In each of these decisions the court gave substantial deference, akin
to obeisance and homage, to largely conclusory and unsupported
legislative assertions that the statutes served to advance legitimate
goals such as reduction of insurance costs. Relatively few of the de-
cisions discussed the issue in depth. 8 6 Nevertheless, the reasoning
of the courts that provide a degree of analysis makes it clear that
absent either (1) a recognition of the need for intermediate review,
or (2) an application of a modicum of realistic demand for proof of
the proffered relationship between the repose statute and its objec-
tives, efforts to void a statute of repose on equal protection grounds
will fail.
Supreme Court decisions provide the lower courts with the
ability to review the factual predicates that allegedly provide the
requisite rational basis. Despite the absence of a holding that the
basis exists "in fact," the Court has, when occasion demanded, en-
gaged in an independent evaluation of the underlying facts to re-
ject a proffered rational basis assertion.
Applying the traditional rule in United States Department of Agri-
culture v. Moreno,18 7 the Court found that a congressional "declara-
tion of policy" failed to support a classification made by the Food
185. See, e.g., Arsenault v. Pa-Ted Spring Co., 523 A.2d 1283, 1284 (Conn.
1987) (relying on Daily v. New Britain Mach. Co., 512 A.2d 893 (Conn. 1986) (ap-
plying rational basis test)); Love v. Whirlpool Corp., 449 S.E.2d 602, 606 (Ga.
1994) (same); Colony Hill Condominium I Ass'n v. Colony Co., 320 S.E.2d 273,
277 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (applying analysis used by Supreme Court of North Caro-
lina in Lamb v. Wedgewood South Corp., 302 S.E.2d 868 (N.C. 1983) (finding
North Carolina's repose statute constitutional), review denied, 325 S.E.2d 485 (N.C.
1985)); see also Zitter, supra note 124 (providing state decisions where rational basis
test was applied to statute of repose).
186. See, e.g., Arsenault, 523 A.2d at 1283 (summarily disposing of case in two
paragraphs). Other courts provided either a conclusory holding or relied on prior
decisions with no further analysis. See Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc., 476 So. 2d 657,
659-60 (Ha. 1985) (receding from earlier decision and summarily holding that
there was no equal protection violation); Spilker v. City of Lincoln, 469 N.W.2d
546 (Neb. 1991) (holding that plaintiffs failed to show statute was unreasonable or
arbitrary); Colony Hill 320 S.E.2d at 273, 276 (relying on prior decisions to summa-
rily state that revival of suit after defendant believed such right was terminated
would violate due process) (citation omitted); Marinelli v. Ford Motor Co., 696
P.2d 1 (Or. Ct. App. 1985) (relying on Davis v. Whiting Corp., 674 P.2d 1194,
review denied, 679 P.2d 1367 (1984), to summarily state that there was no violation
of equal protection or due process);Jones v. Five Star Eng'g, Inc., 717 S.W.2d 882,
882 (Tenn. 1986) (stating that "[t]he constitutional issues, state and federal,
presented in the present appeal [in regard to statute of repose] are almost identi-
cal to those which were considered in detail by this Court .... and we see no need
for repeating those discussions here").
187. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
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Stamp Act (Act). 188 After finding no correlation between the stated
policy and the provision, the Court reviewed both legislative history
and the arguments proffered by the government in support of the
"unrelated person" provisions of the Act. This review concluded
that the classification established was invalid as it lacked any ra-
tional basis to a legitimate governmental interest. The Court held
that "[t]raditional equal protection analysis does not require that
every classification be drawn with precise 'mathematical nicety.'
But the classification here in issue is not only 'imprecise,' it is
wholly without any rational basis."18 9
On occasion the Court has indicated a willingness to reject
claims that a particular statute truly advances a legitimate govern-
ment interest. FiveJustices, in two concurring opinions, recognized
that an equal protection rational basis analysis was appropriate to
reject an Illinois law that barred a claimant's right to a hearing for
wrongful termination because the state's Fair Employment Practice
Commission failed to schedule a hearing within the time required
by statute. 190 Though not utilizing an "in fact" analysis as such,
these Justices made clear that no factual relationship existed be-
tween the classification, which distinguished between those who af-
ter timely filing of a claim could proceed and those who could not
due to the procedural error of the state, and the objectives of elimi-
nating employment discrimination and unfounded claims of dis-
crimination. 191 The true test, consistent with Supreme Court
rulings and giving credence to the need for some footing in real-
ity,192 is actually whether the classification is, in fact, rationally re-
lated to a legitimate governmental interest. The question is the
extent to which the judiciary is willing to utilize this standard of
rational basis review.
Recent decisions of the federal circuit courts provide explica-
tion of rational basis application. 193 The court in Eaton v. Jarvis
188. Id. at 533-38; accord Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) (invalidating
Alaska dividend distribution plan based on years of residency).
189. United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538 (citation
omitted).
190. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 442 (1982) (Blackmun,
J., concurring) (stating that "Illinois scheme also deprives him of his Fourteenth
Amendment right to the equal protection of the laws"); id. at 443-44 (Powell, J.,
concurring) (classification created by Illinois statute violated equal protection).
191. Id. at 438-42 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 443 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
192. See Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 316 (1993) (discussing rational
basis standard in context of Kentucky's statutes for commitment of mentally handi-
capped individuals).
193. See Anderson v. M.W. Kellogg Co., 766 P.2d 637, 644-45 (Colo. 1988) (en
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Products Coip.,1 9 4 reviewed the Colorado statute 195 before conclud-
ing that it posed no violation of equal protection under a rational
basis standard of review.196 After determining that a hydraulic meat
cutting device was "manufacturing equipment" within the meaning
of the statute and other foundational issues,197 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit turned to the plaintiff's con-
stitutional challenge. As with any review of the constitutionality of
legislation, a rebuttable presumption of validity undergirded the
court's analysis. 198 Relying on a prior decision of the Supreme
Court of Colorado, 199 the Eaton court found that the repose provi-
sion involved neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right, and
therefore, rational basis scrutiny was appropriate. The court specif-
ically noted that "the right to recover damages in tort is not a funda-
mental right."200 Thus, the standard was simply to determine
whether "the classification has a rational basis in fact and bears a
rational relationship to legitimate governmental objectives." 20 1
This position enabled the court to ignore whether more than an
economic right was involved or whether heightened scrutiny was a
more appropriate standard of review.
Following a brief digression into the statute's legislative history,
the court set forth a series of related principles to support its ulti-
mate conclusion. The principles relied upon can be summarized
as: (1) a statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any set of
facts can reasonably be conceived to justify it and (2) the classifica-
tion at issue was designed to protect certain injured parties, while
banc) (applying rational basis analysis); Daily v. New Britain Mach. Co., 512 A.2d
893, 901-02 (Conn. 1986) (stating that "relevant inquiry is whether the classifica-
tion and disparate treatment inherent in the statute of repose legislation bears a
rational relationship to a legitimate state end"); Olsen v. J.A. Freeman Co., 791
P.2d 1285, 1289-93 (Idaho 1990) (applying rational basis analysis); Sealey v. Hicks,
788 P.2d 435, 441 (Or.) (applying rational basis analysis), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 819
(1990).
194. 965 F.2d 922 (10th Cir. 1992).
195. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-80-107 (West 1987).
196. Accord Alexander v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 952 F.2d 1215, 1225 (10th Cir.
1991) (finding Indiana statute of repose constitutional); see also Talley v. Lane, 13
F.3d 1031, 1034-35 (7th Cir. 1994) (upholding tenant selection procedures pursu-
ant to Fair Housing Act through application of similarly cursory in fact analysis).
197. Eaton, 965 F.2d at 926-29 (including in analysis discussion of whether
product was manufacturing equipment, whether time period should commence
from addition of component part and whether hidden defect exception to stat-
ute's preclusionary effect was applicable).
198. Id. at 929.
199. Anderson v. M.W. Kellogg Co., 766 P.2d 637 (Colo. 1988) (en banc).
200. Eaton, 965 F.2d at 930 (quoting Austin v. Litvak, 682 P.2d 41, 49-50
(Colo. 1984)).
201. Id. at 929.
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protecting certain manufacturers from open-ended liability for
equipment that would typically reveal defects well before the statu-
tory period ran.20 2 The second point paralleled the recited legisla-
tive history. On these predicates, the Eaton court concluded:
We cannot say that the legislative determination to limit
[the section] to manufacturers of such equipment is irra-
tional. "The Equal Protection Clause does not require that
a State must choose between attacking every aspect of a
problem or not attacking the problem at all. It is enough
that the state's action be rationally based and free from
invidious discrimination." We perceive no violation of
plaintiffs' equal protection rights under either the federal
or state constitutions.203
End of story. As in most such decisions, the Eaton court failed
to question whether the classification had a rational basis "in fact"
despite its inclusion of this element within its statement of law.
This essential element of rational basis analysis was treated as excess
verbiage lacking substantive value.20 4 The court unqualifiedly ac-
cepted the legislative determinations. Rational basis analysis does
not mandate such total acquiescence to legislative findings. This
standard permits a court to at least explore the facts to be sure that
there is a modicum of factual basis to support the classification.
In the earlier case of Kochins v. Linden-Alimak, Inc.,20 5 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit applied princi-
ples identical to those utilized in Eaton and came tantalizingly close
to true "in fact" analysis consistent with the courts' legitimate
202. Id.
203. Id. (citations omitted).
204. Application of the traditional deferential rules led Justice Brennan to
refer to the Court's reasoning as a tautology. United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v.
Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 186 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan argued
that the statute under consideration was upheld without analysis of the rational
relationship between the classification and its stated purpose. Id. at 183-88. Ac-
cording to the dissent, the Court's deferential approach "virtually immunizes social
and economic legislative classifications from judicial review." Id. at 183. Justice
Brennan's approach parallels an "in fact" analysis. Without such review "[a] stat-
ute's classifications will be rationally related to such a purpose because the reach of
the purpose has been derived from the classifications themselves." Note, Legislative
Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123, 128 (1972). A leading
scholar's call for a more stringent rational basis review that would place a "consis-
tent new bite into old equal protection." Gerald Gunther, Forward: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAIv.
L. Rzv. 1, 21 (1972). This suggestion, however, has gone unheeded for almost
twenty-five years.
205. 799 F.2d 1128 (6th Cir. 1986).
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role.2 06 Regrettably, in the final analysis, the court upheld a Ten-
nessee repose statute on little more than the strength of the stat-
ute's preamble, finding that "[w]e cannot say that the legislature's
decision to limit [the statute of repose] to those defendants in the
manufacturing and distribution chain, who have control over the
cost and availability of products, is irrational."2 0 7
Unlike Eaton, this was not the end of the story. The Kochins
court summarized the evidence that the plaintiff proffered to sup-
port the contention that there was no factual basis upon which to
validate the legislative action. The plaintiff presented the commen-
tary to section 101 of the Model Uniform Products Liability Act
which stated that individual states could do little to solve the
problems caused by products liability.20 8 Another study showed
that ninety-seven percent of all product related accidents occurred
within six years of their original purchase. Therefore, this ten year
statute would not significantly impact the products liability crisis.20 9
The Kochins court conceded that these authorities "persuasively sug-
gest that the legislative goals [of the statute of repose] are not likely
to be accomplished by the means selected."210
The legislation's lack of efficacy was ignored in favor of the
statute's preamble and general policies attributable to any statute of
limitations.211 Although it has long been recognized that "a foolish
206. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit also applied
an "in fact" analysis to uphold provisions of the Housing Act. Baker v. Cincinnati
Metro. Housing Auth., 675 F.2d 836 (6th Cir. 1982).
207. Kochins, 799 F.2d at 1138.
208. Id. at 1140 (citing 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,716 (1979)).
209. Id.
210. Id. In contrast, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, applying traditional rational basis analysis, actually engaged in an "in
fact" analysis to first reject and then accept military regulations, which were ap-
plied to the dismissal of a naval officer based on an admission of homosexuality.
Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (granting rehearing en banc), rev'd, 41
F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (reinstating original district court judgment).
211. Kochins, 799 F.2d at 1140. The outcome of both Kochins and Steffan may,
however, be consistent with precedents of the Supreme Court which normally
make no reference to an "in fact" standard. See Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221,
234 (1981) (noting that while rational basis standard is " 'not a toothless standard'
... it does not allow us to substitute ... [the Court's] personal notions of good
public policy for those of Congress"); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426-28
(1961) (upholding statute because there was no indication of unreasonableness
without specifically relying on any indication of legislative findings that the classifi-
cation was in fact reasonable); see also Eaton v. Jarvis Prods. Corp., 965 F.2d 922,
929 (10th Cir. 1992) (relying on Supreme Court decisions that did not utilize "in
fact" standard). Schweiker reasoned that a deferential approach was consistent with
the democratic process. Schweiker, 450 U.S. at 230; see also Lyng v. International
Union, United Auto. Workers, 485 U.S. 360, 370 (1988) (stressing that "this stan-
dard of review is typically quite deferential").
1028
HeinOnline  -- 40 Vill. L. Rev. 1028 1995
1995] CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION OF REPOSE STATUTES
consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds,"21 2 it is hard to accept
this inconsistency as anything but foolish. The court admitted that
there was no relationship in fact to the objectives sought to be
served other than those common to any statute of limitations. The
court simply conformed to its belief as to what the Supreme Court
of Tennessee would have done and exhibited what it believed to be
appropriate deference to the state legislature.2 13 This reasoning ig-
nored reality and the governing constitutional principle.
It is precisely such lack of factual application that has led the
courts to improperly uphold statutes of repose under the rational
basis test. Proper application of this minimalist standard, absent
evidence to refute the large body of factual data rejecting a rational
basis in fact, requires a conclusion that statutes of repose fail to
comport with equal protection.
The degree of deference owed to congressional action is cer-
tainly less than that traditionally applied through rational basis
analysis. Had the Kochins court followed its own finding that the
evidence did not support the legislatively announced objectives, it
could have decided the case properly. United States Supreme
Court decisions and the views of various members of that Court
provide ample support for concluding that the Kochins court's find-
ing was sufficient to negate the subject statute of repose on equal
protection grounds.
The plurality opinion in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefiai14
had no difficulty in taking issue with congressional action and dealt
with the merits of the particular affirmative action program before
it began its independent analysis of the facts and law. A pervasive
element of the dissenting opinion was that the plurality failed to
recognize the "large deference owed by the judiciary to 'Congress'
institutional competence and constitutional authority.' ,215 The
deferential approach of the dissenters, regardless of the validity of
their ultimate conclusions of law, was neither necessary nor proper
to support their conclusions. SeveralJustices of the Supreme Court
have made clear that the determination of rational basis assertions
is a judicial rather than a legislative function. Though not utilizing
212. RALPH W. EMERSON, Self Reliance, in THE ESSAYS OF RALPH WALDO EMER-
SON 24 (The Heritage Press 1962).
213. Kochins, 799 F.2d at 1141. The case was before the court through diver-
sityjurisdiction obligating application of the substantive law of Tennessee pursuant
to Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Application of federal equal protec-
tion standards requires no such reliance upon, or deference to, state law.
214. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
215. Id. at 2134 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quotation omitted).
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the "in fact" language of some circuit courts, these Justices effec-
tively demand precisely such analysis.
Commerce Clause jurisprudence provides a good example of
the Court applying an independent analysis of rational basis asser-
tions. Recognizing that broad application of the Commerce Clause
could obliterate distinctions between what is deemed national and
what is deemed local, the Court recently found that because a warn-
ing of this danger was enunciated "the Court has heeded that warn-
ing and undertaken to decide whether a rational basis existed for
concluding that a regulated activity sufficiently affected interstate
commerce."21 6 The Court then performed an "independent evalu-
ation" through a comprehensive "in fact" analysis as to whether the
subject firearms provision had a rational basis and connection to
interstate commerce. 217
That the Court, not Congress, is the proper arbiter of such
claims was succinctly stated in prior decisions. " 'Simply because
Congress may conclude that a particular activity substantially affects
interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so.' "218
"Whether particular operations affect interstate commerce suffi-
ciently to come under the constitutional power of Congress to regu-
late them is ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative question,
and can be settled finally only by this Court."2 19 Fairness, consis-
tency and logic compel the Court to utilize a similarly realistic ap-
proach and exercise of judicial review in ascertaining the
216. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1629 (1995); cf Lebron v. Na-
tional R.R. Passenger Corp., 115 S. Ct. 961 (1995). In Lebron, the Court had to
determine whether the First Amendment applied to actions of Amtrak as an
agency or establishment of the government. Id. at 964. The Court observed that
the enabling statute for Amtrak used language generally found in Interstate Com-
merce Act based legislation. Id. at 967. Additionally, the Court noted that "[Am-
trak's] authorizing statute declares that it 'will not be an agency or establishment
of the United States Government.'" Id. at 970. After a thorough factual review of
the structure and functions of Amtrak, the Court determined that Amtrak was sub-
ject to the obligations of the First Amendment as it was a part of government. Id.
at 970-71.
217. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631 ("[A]s part of our independent evaluation of
constitutionality under the Commerce Clause we of course consider legislative
findings, and ... congressional committee findings .... ") (citation omitted).
218. Id. at 1629 n.2 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 311 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)). In his concurrence
in Hode4 Justice Rehnquist stressed that "there are constitutional limits on the
power of Congress to regulate pursuant to the Commerce Clause," and that "Con-
gress must show that the activity it seeks to regulate has a substantial effect on inter-
state commerce." Hodel, 452 U.S. at 309, 313 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (second
emphasis added).
219. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629, n.2. (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 273 (1964) (Black, J., concurring)).
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constitutional validity of statutes limiting a party's right to seek re-
dress for product induced injury.
This approach is consistent with principles of federalism:
[I]t would be mistaken and mischievous for the political
branches to forget that the sworn obligation to preserve
and protect the Constitution in maintaining the federal
balance is their own in the first and primary instance....
[S]ome Congresses have accepted responsibility to con-
front the great questions of the proper federal balance in
terms of lasting consequences for the constitutional de-
sign. The political branches of the Government must ful-
fill this grave constitutional obligation if democratic
liberty and the federalism that secures it are to endure.220
To assure that the law-making branches of government do not vio-
late this obligation, it is imperative that the judiciary not renounce
its role. The judicial branch must exercise its proper role as the
final arbiter, reject the automatic conclusion of "since Congress
said so it must be so," and recognize that this is, in fact, a judicial
question.
C. Data Fail to Provide a Rational Basis Even Under a
"Step by Step" Analysis
A legislative body need not address the totality of a given prob-
lem in a single piece of legislation. 221 Limited legislation that evi-
dences a step by step approach to problem resolution is
appropriate. Such legislation can be judicially evaluated on its indi-
vidual merits. This principle is often applied to uphold economic
or social directed legislative enactments that are under-inclusive.
220. Id. at 1639 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing fundamental aspects of
federalism); see H.R. REP. No. 63, supra note 1, at 27 (minority views) (arguing that
proposed products liability reform is contrary to interests of federalism); see also S.
REP. No. 69, supra note 4, at 64-66 (minority views of Sen. Hollings) (asserting that
current system is consistent with principles of federalism and concluding that this
fundamental concept should not be "tinkered" with "as the record [before Con-
gress] we have on this issue is insufficient to take such action").
221. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955)
("[R] eform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the prob-
lem which seems most acute to the legislative mind.") (citation omitted); Eaton v.
Jarvis Prods. Corp., 965 F.2d 922, 930 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating that legislature is
not required to fix entire problem or none of problem) (citation omitted). The
vast majority of provisions in the pending legislation are rationally related to a
legitimate governmental purpose. However, limited aspects of the Act, in both the
House and Senate versions, are subject to constitutional attack. The analysis that
follows is directed solely to the statute of repose.
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One perception of statutes of repose is that they bear upon eco-
nomic rights rather than broader substantive rights. For purposes
of the discussion that follows, this erroneous perception will be ac-
cepted. Therefore, an under-inclusive products liability statute of
repose is subject to step by step evaluation.
Products liability repose statutes apply to the limited number
of persons who sustain product related injury after passage of a
specified period of time. The majority of state statutes of repose
contain limitations of approximately ten years,222 whereas the pro-
posed national provision will contain either a fifteen or twenty year
repose period.223 Products liability repose statutes have no applica-
tion to the vastly wider body of personal injury claimants injured by
other forms of tortious conduct or to injuries caused by identical
products at earlier times. The proposed national products liability
statute of repose applies to only a small percentage of possible
claims that would come within the purview of a broader statute di-
rected to overall tort reform.
Under-inclusivity is also evident as only a marginal number of
products liability claims will be affected by a fifteen or twenty year
repose statute. Unlike a party's failure to comply with an applicable
statute of limitations, which can be attributed to his or her fault, a
party precluded from action through a statute of repose is barred
by events beyond that party's control. In this sense, repose provi-
sions are under-inclusive by virtue of their random application.
A statute that represents a proper initial step toward problem
resolution is valid provided that this step meets constitutional mus-
ter. The proposed national statute of repose, if rationally related to
resolution of an economic concern even though it is only a partial
answer to that problem, should be upheld under rational basis
analysis.
The available data make manifest that the statute of repose
under consideration by Congress fails to address any significant as-
pect of the products liability crisis. The statute of repose concept,
as a means to provide adequate insurance to manufacturers and to
prevent problems of proof in the defense of products liability
claims, rests not on fact but on quicksand and unsubstantiated
opinion. This under-inclusive provision violates equal protection.
222. Sixteen states have statutes of repose. S. REP. No. 69, supra note 4, at 44.
Twenty states have enacted products liability statutes of repose of which seven have
been repealed or declared unconstitutional. See Appendix.
223. H.R. 956, supra note 2, § 106 contains a fifteen year statute of repose,
while H.R. 956, supra note 13, § 109 (Senate amended) contains a twenty year
provision.
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1. The Myths of an Insurance Crisis and Litigation Explosion224
a. The Insurance Crisis
Perception is not necessarily reality. Basic principles of logic
dictate that the expression of an opinion as a fact, even a legislative
opinion, does not magically transform that opinion into fact. This
distinction was judicially recognized as early as 1979 in regard to
the insurance crisis2 25 and the inability of state repose provisions to
meaningfully address any such crisis. A realistic appraisal of rele-
vant information as to the availability and cost of products liability
insurance, the impact of products liability litigation on the civil jus-
tice system and other claims supporting imposition of a national
statute of repose reveal that these claims are predicated on percep-
tion rather than fact. These gossamer assertions must not be recog-
nized as establishing a rational basis in fact between congressional
objectives and the effects of the repose statute.
That the insurance crisis was founded on perception rather
than reality is evident in a highly respected report, the Final Report
issued by the Interagency Task Force on Product Liability.226 As to
the causes of the insurance problem, this report stated:
There is a limited statistical basis for setting premiums or
establishing coverage limits for a very wide range of prod-
ucts, especially non-consumer products .... Such insur-
ance determinations are made on a highly judgmental
basis. Because subjective judgement plays such an impor-
tant role, psychological factors such as the "likelihood of
big judgements," "heightened consumer awareness," "hor-
ror stories," and "the need to be especially conservative"
... are important .... [T]his atmosphere of uncertainty,
at least in theory, can be reinforced by perceptions that the
law is confused .... Thus, perceptions of reality become
224. Due to the extensive legislative history of H.R. 956 and its predecessors,
it is not possible to fairly present the extensive material contained in records of the
congressional hearings. See H.R. REP. No. 63, supra note 1, at 12-14 (providing
reports of legislative history and hearings); S. REP. No. 69, supra note 4, at 14-17
(same). This article, therefore, relies on the respective Committee Reports.
225. In regard to the insurance crisis, a respected commentator more re-
cently observed: "(T] he crisis was not caused by a civil litigation 'explosion'-there
was no explosion.... It would be inaccurate to say that the tort system had abso-
lutely no effect on the sharp premium increases during the mid-1980's. But the
effect was primarily the result of fear." JerryJ. Phillips, Attacks on the Legal System-
Fallacy of 'Tort Reform' Arguments, TRIAL, Feb. 1992, at 106 (citations omitted).
226. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PROD-
UCT LIABILITY, FINAL REPORT OF THE LEGAL STUDY, Vol. III (Jan. 1977) [hereinafter
FINAL REPORT].
1033
HeinOnline  -- 40 Vill. L. Rev. 1033 1995
VILLA'ovA LAW REVIEW
as important as reality when subjective judgments are be-
ing made.2 2 7
The report further indicated that the insurance availability
problem is an isolated situation.228 Responses to the task force
surveys indicated that there was no widespread problem in ob-
taining insurance.22 9 Perhaps even more important, there was no
direct verifiable evidence that products liability insurance had been
the cause of any business failure.23 0 Business failures blamed on
products liability are caused by many factors including litigation ex-
pense, compensatory liability exposure, punitive damages exposure
and other transaction costs including government safety regulation
compliance.23' A logic that lumps these factors together with the
cost of insurance so as to permit a conclusion that insurance caused
the failure would readily be rejected by Mr. Spock. Yet, precisely
such logic is reflected in the finding that eighteen companies no
longer produce football helmets "due to liability exposure."2 32 No
data is provided to establish the relationship of such exposure to
the business failure. No mention is made of the fact that football
helmets are currently marketed and that, perhaps, those who still
market do so because they produced the better helmet.
Legislative action cannot be predicated on false logic and per-
ception even if this is an accepted practice in the insurance indus-
try. When a legislature predicates its judgments on non-facts, it
eliminates any reasonable basis for relying on the legislative deter-
227. Id. at 127-28. Whether there was a crisis regarding products liability
availability and cost in the 1980s remains an open question. There is some evi-
dence supporting a link between reform of products liability law and reduction of
insurance rates, but there is also substantial reason to be skeptical. See Theodore
Eisenberg &James A. Henderson,Jr., Inside the Quiet Revolution in Products Liability,
39 UCLA L. REV. 731, 792 & nn. 167-71 (1992). Assuming that (1) there was a
crisis, and (2) reform was needed to resolve it, no such crisis exists in 1995.
228. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PROD-
ucr LIAmILrrY, SELECTED PAPERS 50 (Oct. 31, 1979) (statement of Melvin Block).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Punitive damages is a wild card which can complicate both exposure
evaluation and settlement efforts. Calculating the cost of punitive damages as part
of insurance rate setting is difficult due to their unpredictable nature and because
in a significant number of states, such damages cannot be insured against for pub-
lic policy reasons. See 15A GEORGE J. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAw 2D
§ 56.9 (rev. ed. 1983 & Supp. 1995) (providing analysis of insurability of punitive
damages, with extensive case citation);JAMES D. GHIARDI &JOHNJ. KIRCHER, PUNI-
TIE DAMAGES: LAW AND PRACTICE, §§ 7.11-14 (1984 & Supp. 1995) (same);
Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Liability Insurance Coverage as Extending to Lia-
bility for Punitive or Exemplay Damages, 16A.L.R.4th 11 (1982 & Supp. 1995) (same).
232. H.R. REP. No. 63, supra note 1, at 10.
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mination. Even in the 1980s, at the height of the perceived insur-
ance crisis, those courts that seriously examined the claim found
evidence that raised serious doubt as to the legislative perceptions.
The Supreme Court of Alabama, after review of the Final Re-
port of the Federal Interagency Task Force on Product Liability,
found that "[e]ven though the Task Force and others have alluded
to the 'long-tail' claims problem, as far as this Court can ascertain,
the problem has not been documented."233 The opinion also re-
ferred to the Analysis to Section 110 of the Model Uniform Product
Liability Act which recognized that " '[t] he limited available data
show that insurers' apprehension about older products may be exag-
gerated.' ",234 Even the Insurance Service Office, the rate-making
arm of the insurance industry, found that only 2.7% of products
involved in products liability litigation were purchased more than
six years prior to the injury-causing event.23 5
Alabama's reliance on this data was echoed by the Supreme
Court of Utah which also recognized that because insurance rates
are based on an "occurrence" basis, the number of cases arising
after its state's six year period took effect "[are] insignificant and, at
best, would have a negligible effect on insurance rates generally."23 6
A statute of repose, as recognized by these courts, has a de minimis
effect on both insurance rate reduction and insurance availability.
As the pending repose statute treats claims based on products that
are at least fifteen years old, one can rationally and reasonably con-
clude that this statute would have an even less significant effect
than the minimal effect found by these courts.23 7 Therefore, the
233. Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 416 So. 2d 996, 1001 (Ala. 1982);
accord Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 683 (Utah 1985) (focusing pri-
marily on insurance issue as it existed in Utah and finding that "[the statute of
repose] effect in that regard is more 'fanciful than real' ") (quoting Malan v.
Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 673 (Utah 1983)). Both courts rejected perception and fo-
cused on reality. Lankford, 416 So. 2d at 1002; Bery, 717 P.2d at 683.
234. Lankford, 416 So. 2d at 1002 (quoting Insurance Services Office Survey
indicating that over 97% of product related accidents occur within six years of
product purchase).
235. Id. (relying on Louis N. Massery, Date-of-Sale Statutes of Limitation-A New
Immunity for Product Suppliers, 1977 INS. L.J. 535, 542 which provided study based on
review of 7800 claims closed between July 1 and November 1, 1976 by 23 major
insurance carriers).
236. Beny, 717 P.2d at 682-83.
237. If we assume that more than doubling the time frame, from six years to
fifteen years, will result in a limited reduction of claims to 2%, the actual number
of claims affected will be modest. On the federal level, some 13,554 products lia-
bility cases were filed in 1985. MichaelJ. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the
Behavior of the Tort Litigation System-And Why Not? 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1147, 1202
(1992). Applying a 4% growth rate, the number of federal filings would be less
than 20,000 in 1995. See S. REP. No. 69, supra note 4, at 60 (minority views of Sen.
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pending repose statute has even less relationship to the congres-
sional objective.
A national repose statute could theoretically have a more sig-
nificant impact than state statutes in that insurance rates are gener-
ally based on national rather than local occurrences. No such
effect is likely. Available data suggests that neither insurance rates
nor availability will be affected by a limitation on the small number
of products liability claims that would be precluded by the pending
legislation. The number of occurrences affected is so small as to
foster no significant change in the insurance picture.
The need for a repose statute precluding products liability ac-
tions, twelve years after sale, was rejected in New Hampshire pre-
cisely because the perceived insurance crisis had abated by 1983,
the year in which the New Hampshire Supreme Court decided
Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.23 8 The Heath court stated:
Nor do we think that the twelve-year "statute of repose" is
substantially related to a legitimate legislative object. As
previously noted, the crisis in products liability insurance
had abated nationwide independent of RSA chapter 507-D
(Supp. 1979). Nonetheless, persons injured by defective
products are deprived arbitrarily of a right to sue ... by
virtue of a statute that has become entirely divorced from
its underlying purpose.239
The absence of a national insurance crisis negates the congres-
sional finding that the Product Liability Fairness Act will resolve the
problem of increased insurance cost.2 40 This essential congres-
sional finding is based on something other than fact. Data accumu-
lated since 1983 establishes that the insurance crisis has abated and
that other foundational beliefs supporting the statute of repose are
misplaced.2 41
Hollings). This would yield 400 cases potentially affected by the repose provision.
Even this number is excessive as many of these cases will involve products which
have been on the market for less than fifteen years.
On a state level, from July 1, 1991 through June 30, 1992, 12,857 products
liability cases (excluding toxic tort cases) were resolved in the nation's 75 most
populous counties. See Barbara Franklin, Learning Curve, 81 A.BA. J. 62, 65 (1995)
(citing data obtained from Civil Trial Court Network). Less than 250 such cases
would have been affected, a number less than that of the average in just two
counties.
238. 464 A.2d 288 (N.H. 1983).
239. Id. at 296.
240. See generally H.R. 956, supra note 2, § 2(a) (8) (listing congressional
findings).
241. S. REP. No. 69, supra note 4, at 66 (minority views of Sen. Hollings). The
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The Senate Report's discussion of insurance costs is limited in
terms of detail, yet general in terms of conclusions. The most sig-
nificant discussion appears in the materials directed to the statute
of repose. 242 The Report correctly observes instances in which
machine tools over one hundred years old have been the subject of
litigation which, though often won by the manufacturer, carry ex-
tensive transaction costs.2 43 Due to the passage of time, many prod-
ucts are modified by one or more owners, yet the manufacturer can
still be targeted.244 Somehow these facts are amalgamated into the
concept of total cost distribution that shows that seven dollars are
paid in defense costs for every ten dollars paid to claimants. 245 The
two points are distinct. The first refers to a limited number of
claims, while the second is based on all claims. The modification
problem is addressed by the alteration and misuse provisions of the
proposed legislation.2 46
The alteration provision would reduce potential liability but
would not eliminate all associated transaction costs. 247 Transaction
costs, however, would be substantially reduced by a provision en-
couraging the use of summary judgment procedures, while permit-
ting suits to go forward where a true manufacturing defect is
attributable to the manufacturer. Such a provision could rely on a
presumption of non-defect, require affirmative proof of a defect
that existed and was not created by alteration of the product, and
allow application of state law that often results in summary judg-
minority view of the Senate Report notes that a 1983 study by the Institute for Civil
Justice concluded that evidence did not support the claim that products liability
filings imposed unreasonable insurance costs on manufacturers. Id. (citing Rand
Corporation, The Institute for Civil Justice, Designing Safer Products: Corporate Re-
sponses to Product Liability Law and Regulation 121 (1983)).
242. S. REP. No. 69, supra note 4, at 43-44.
243. Id. The Senate Report cites testimony before the House Judiciary Com-
mittee by Charles E. Gilbert, Jr., President of Cincinnati Gilbert Machine Tool
Company. Id. Mr. Gilbert noted that while such products liability suits are gener-
ally not successful, they result in an inefficient appropriation of corporate re-
sources for defense, which hinders job creation and global competition. Id. at 44.
Mr. Gilbert further testified that "[f ] oreign corporations rarely have machines in
this country that are more than 40 or more years old, so they pay less liability
insurance than their American competitors." Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 43.
246. H.R. 956, supra note 2, § 104; H.R. 956, supra note 13, § 106 (Senate
amended).
247. S. Rm,. No 69, supra note 4, at 34. The alteration provision would reduce
potential manufacturer liability by allowing a reduction of damages proportionate
to the claimant's responsibility attributable to product misuse or alteration. Id.
The provision, however, would not preclude plaintiff awards even where product
alteration substantially caused injury. Id.
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ment where product modification was the proximate cause of
harm.2 48
The Report also emphasizes an assertion that foreign competi-
tors rarely have products in this country that are forty years old.249
No data are provided to support this claim although it is logically
correct in that major import of foreign products did not begin until
the late 1960s. Yet the repose provision is directed to a fifteen or
twenty year period and many foreign products now found in the
United States were manufactured more than twenty years ago.25 0
On these predicates and unstated premises, the Report finds
that the repose provision "provides a balanced solution to the prob-
lem of 'long tail' liability" and places "a reasonable outer time limit
on litigation involving older products used in the workplace." 251
The Report provides no real support for the existence of a "long
tail" problem in terms of actual cost of insurance or production.
Further, no attention is paid to the fact that the repose provision is
also applicable to products utilized outside the workplace. The
shallowness of the Senate Majority Report's reasoning is exposed in
the Minority Report.25 2
The Minority Report relies initially on data similar to that re-
lied upon by the courts.253 In addition, it exposes the absence of a
relationship between insurance rates and excessive products liabil-
ity claims.254 Early analysis by Victor Schwartz, then chairman of
the Commerce Department's Task Force on Product Liability, indi-
248. See, e.g., Woods v. Graham Eng'g Corp., 539 N.E.2d 316, 320 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1989) (holding that manufacturer is only liable when manufacturer is responsi-
ble for the design of product which caused injury, therefore when product altera-
tion is unforeseeable by manufacturer, manufacturer is not liable as matter of law);
Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 403 N.E.2d 440, 441 (N.Y.
1980) ("We hold that a manufacturer of a product may not be cast in damages,
either on a strict products liability or negligence cause of action, where, after the
product leaves the possession and control of the manufacturer, there is a subse-
quent modification which substantially alters the product and is the proximate
cause of plaintiff's injuries."); King v. K.R. Wilson Co., 455 N.E.2d 1282, 1282
(Ohio 1983) (per curiam) (affirming trial court's grant of summary judgment
when "press had been substantially altered and that there was insufficient proof to
hold K.R. Wilson liable for an averred design defect in the unaltered portion of
machine").
249. S. REP. No. 69, supra note 4, at 44.
250. Id. at 43. This would seem to refute the legislation's foundation premise
which is "to level the playing field and allow these loyal corporate citizens to com-
pete in the global marketplace." Id.
251. Id. at 44.
252. Id. at 56-80 (minority views of Sen. Hollings).
253. For a discussion ofjudicial reliance on such data, see supra notes 239-45
and accompanying text.
254. S. REP. No. 69, supra note 4, at 66-67 (minority views of Sen. Hollings).
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cated that " 'no one has ever demonstrated that the huge increases
in product liability premiums in recent years were related to the
number and/or size of product liability claims.' "255 Various other
sources are cited to establish that this linkage is not satisfactorily
established to the present time.256
The core factor is less speculative. "There is ample evidence
that the increases in product liability insurance costs were actually
the result of the cyclical nature of the insurance industry and...
underwriting practices, not product liability."257 These cycles relate
to fluctuation between hard and soft insurance markets, the degree
of competition for available premium volume and interest rates. 258
Insurance industry data show that even during the purported crisis
of the 1980s, the industry was highly profitable.2 59 "A compilation
of the Institute's annual statistics shows that, between 1984-1994,
property/casualty companies had a net after-tax income of approxi-
mately $100 billion and an increase in surplus of $63 billion to $190
billion."260
If there is a "long tail" problem, it is obviously of limited im-
pact. A statute of repose is not necessary to provide adequate insur-
ance protection at reasonable cost. Any crisis in the cost or
availability of insurance to product manufacturers is historical, not
current. Nothing suggests that such a problem will emerge in the
future. Everything suggests that any untoward increase in insur-
ance rates will be attributed to the practices of the industry with
little or no effect based on the limited number of suits that could be
barred by the statute of repose.
b. The Litigation Explosion
Invalid perceptions also permeate discussion of the impact of
tort litigation on the justice system. Available data mandate the
conclusion that a statute of repose represents an overreaction to a
perceived explosion of products liability and tort litigation.
Although the public and many members of Congress may believe
there is a tort based litigation explosion, the litigation growth is
realistically attributable to developments in other areas of law cou-
pled with the dramatic impact of cases generated by a few specific
255. Id. (quoting Apr. 25, 1980 letter from Schwartz to Sen. Adlai Stevensen).
256. Id. at 67.
257. Id.
258. S. REP. No. 69 at 67-68 (minority views of Sen. Hollings).
259. Id. at 68.
260. Id. (relying on statistical data provided by Insurance Information
Institute).
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products such as Bendectin, asbestos and possibly silicon breast
implants.
The pending national products liability statute of repose is an
exercise in futility. It will not preclude a primary source of prod-
ucts liability litigation, asbestos claims, nor a substantial body of eth-
ical drug and medical device claims as they will fall within the
discovery rule exception or cause harm well within the statutory pe-
riod. Further, the lengthy time frame will allow over 97% of all
products claims even without the discovery rule exemption.
A significant number of products liability cases arise from
workplace injuries.2 61 This is one of the few areas where the repose
statute will have an effect, but it will be limited to something in the
range of two percent of all such claims. Manufacturing equipment,
such as the punch press, is one category of product that often re-
mains functional beyond fifteen to twenty years. Yet "the number
of workplace injuries and deaths are down in both absolute terms
and as a population-adjusted rate."2 62 Using a statute of repose to
address so small a number of possible claims, where the injury rate
is already showing a downward trend, is analogous to repairing a
swiss watch with a sledgehammer.
It has been claimed that the cause of this reduction in injuries
is unknown and, therefore, attempts at reform are no more than
"shots in the dark."263 The reasons for this reduction in injuries
and death can, however, be traced to a number of developments
which negate the need for any "shot." Enforcement of worker
safety standards through the Occupational Safety and Health Ad-
ministration (OSHA), combined with similar agencies at the state
level, is no doubt having a salutary effect. Improvements in product
design and safety warnings are further reducing injuries. Corporate
recognition that the cost of workers' compensation claims and over-
all production costs can be reduced by greater emphasis on provid-
ing a safe workplace also plays a significant role in this reduction.
On a broader level, the safety inducements theorized when courts
adopted the doctrine of strict liability in tort have had a practical
effect.
'the isolation of products liability actions for imposition of a
statute of repose, based on a belief that the number of such actions
261. Id. at 42 (focusing on workplace injury in its discussion of statute of re-
pose while supporting provision which goes well beyond workplace products).
262. Saks, supra note 237, at 1178 (relying on NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, Ac-
CIDENT FACTS 1989 14-15 (1989)).
263. Id.
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is rapidly expanding in comparison to overall filings in the federal
courts, cannot be substantiated through analysis of federal court
statistics. By the mid-1980s, some one-third of all products liability
actions filed in the federal courts were predicated on the health
hazards of asbestos. 264 Due to the long latency period between ex-
posure and manifestation of either asbestosis or mesothelioma, the
discovery rule set forth in the House version of H.R. 956 would al-
low most of such actions despite passage of the repose period. The
exclusion of toxic tort actions from the repose period found in the
Senate amended version would have the same effect. Moreover, if
pharmaceutical claims are also beyond the purview of the statute of
repose as those that cause latent manifestation of disease or other
medical problems will be, the growth rate in products liability
claims (without asbestos and pharmaceutical) is remarkably similar
to the growth rate of tort claims generally. Moreover, pharmaceuti-
cal manufacturers are already beneficiaries of state laws that pro-
vide substantial protection when such products are properly
marketed consistent with federal standards.2 65
The burgeoning case load imposed on the federal judiciary is
real. What is not real is the claim that it is largely attributable to
products liability actions. Bearing in mind that the number of
products affected by the proposed statute is extremely small, the
broader figures take on even greater significance. These figures
show that from 1976 to 1985, the growth rate in products litigation
claims was 267%.266 While tort claims generally, including products
liability claims, were increasing at a 62% rate, non-tort case filings
264. See S. REP. No. 69, supra note 4, at 59-60 (noting that asbestos claims
accounted for substantial increases in product liability filings during 1980s); see also
Eisenberg & Henderson, supra note 227, at 734 n.6 (recognizing that asbestos liti-
gation currently comprises more than half of all federal products liability filings).
265. See, e.g., ARuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-701 (1992) (stating compliance with
terms of FDA approval or specified federal Acts bars imposition of punitive dam-
ages); OHo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2307.75(D), 2307.76(C) (Anderson 1995) (hold-
ing unavoidably dangerous ethical drugs and devices are not defective in design or
formulation if proper warning is given to physician or other proper party and FDA
does not require direct warning to user); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-2 (1995) (stat-
ing compliance with terms of FDA approval or specified federal Acts bars imposi-
tion of punitive damages); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965)
(stating standard uniformly followed in states which precludes finding defect for
unavoidably unsafe products where adequate warning is provided); see also
Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89 (Utah 1991) (holding that FDA approval
negates design defect).
266. Saks, supra note 237, at 1203. This finding is based on data accumulated
from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts and Tort Policy Report.
Id. House Report 63 asserts that from 1973 to 1988, products liability suits in fed-
eral courts increased by 1,000% while state court actions increased by between
300% and 500%. H.R. REP. No. 63, supra note 1, at 9. Much of this data is suspect.
1041
HeinOnline  -- 40 Vill. L. Rev. 1041 1995
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
increased by 153%.267 Indeed, the data indicates that social secur-
ity cases increased by 238% and contract-based claims by 117% dur-
ing this period. 268
Utilizing a different approach, other scholars have concluded
that if cases predicated on injuries allegedly attributable to Bendec-
tin and the Dalkon Shield are removed from the equation, then
presumably overall products liability filings have been declining
since 1981.269 This methodology establishes that the entire in-
crease in products liability filings from 1981 to 1985 was attributa-
ble to these two products. The proposed repose statute would not
affect Bendectin or Dalkon Shield litigation.270
It is difficult, however, to attribute the reduction in filings to
trends in the incidence rate of products related injuries or death.
The number of accidental injuries declined from 1975 to 1982 and
the number of accidental deaths declined from 1975 to 1983.271
Disabling injuries have remained fairly consistent since 1982 and
there has been an overall increase in accidental injuries and deaths
since the early to mid-1980s. 272 It must also be recognized that the
number of filings can increase even if a smaller percentage of in-
jured parties file suit as both the number of products and the over-
all population subject to injury continue to grow. Thus, the decline
in filed claims cannot be attributed to a decreasing number of po-
tential suits. It is more appropriate to view the decline as related to
changes in legal doctrine 273 or the current environment regarding
See Saks, supra note 239, at 1202-04 (challenging statistical veracity of products lia-
bility growth estimates).
267. Saks, supra note 237, at 1198.
268. Id. at 1200-01.
269. Eisenberg & Henderson, supra note 227, at 743. The decline is even
more precipitous if asbestos claims are added to the equation. This conclusion is
based on a comparison to the Gross National Product for personal expenditures
on durable and nondurable consumer goods.
270. Bendectin allegedly causes birth defects which are discoverable at, or
shortly after, birth. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Dangers associated with the Dalkon Shield, which has been off the market for
many years, were evident shortly after its use became widespread. See Walter L.
McCombs & James F. Szaller, Note, The Intrauterine Device: A Criticism of Governmen-
tal Complaisance and an Analysis of Manufacturer and Physician Liability, 24 CLEv. ST.
L. REv. 247, 247-53 (1975) (noting inherent hazards of IUD's on female physiol-
ogy). Further, House Report 63 indicates that despite substantial success in de-
fending Bendectin actions, the manufacturer withdrew the drug from the market
after facing nearly 1,700 actions following a 1969 publication possibly linking the
drug to birth defects. H.R. REP. No. 63, supra note 1, at 10.
271. Eisenberg & Henderson, supra note 227, at 750.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 751. The authors also contend that the decline is not attributable
to the influx of cases 10 years ago where the bar was seeking to establish the viabil-
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products liability claims.
The small number of cases involving products within the pur-
view of the repose statute will not attain the goal of reducing the
number of federal court filings.274 To address this problem in a
rational manner requires broader based products liability and tort
reform and other modifications. Absent an ability to reduce calen-
dar congestion in the state systems, the federal judicial system pro-
vides an alternative forum for products liability actions in the
substantial number of cases where the necessary diversity exists.
Moreover, differences in federal rules of evidence and procedure
can encourage the filing of suits in federal court rather than state
courts. For example, any products case involving new scientific or
medical claims is more likely to be filed in a federal court consistent
with the law laid down in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical,
Inc.,275 than in a state court retaining the law of Frye v. United
States.2 76
Of course, a national repose statute would bear on both fed-
eral and state actions with its major impact on state actions. The
vast majority of products liability claims are filed in state courts. 277
Despite the assertion that state court products liability suits have
increased dramatically, other data reveal a vastly different picture.
A recent study concludes that products liability cases comprise only
.36% of all state civil filings.2 78 More importantly, the number of
products liability cases in the federal courts, excluding asbestos ac-
tions, declined 36% between 1985 and 1991.279
Eisenberg and Henderson's empirical study of products liabil-
ity of various claims and that, with the success of such suits, the suits left for litiga-
tion today are factually weaker. Id. at 754-60.
274. Congressional findings include assertions that there is abuse of the civil
justice system and that the United States is an overly litigious nation. H.R. 956,
supra note 2, § 2(a)(1)-(2).
275. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
276. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Daubert rejected Frye's "general accept-
ance" rule for admissibility of scientific evidence as inconsistent with the Rules of
Evidence. Daubert, 506 U.S. at 917. The Court replaced this standard with a bal-
ancing test that allows the trial judge, as the "gatekeeper," to consider "general
acceptance" as one of several factors bearing on the trial court's discretionary
power to admit or reject evidence. Id. In addition, counsel's belief as to the qual-
ity of the judiciary, quality of the jury panels, the prestige or ego factor related to
federal litigation and relative court congestion can bear on forum selection.
277. Saks, supra note 237, at 1205 (indicating that 98% of filings are in state
courts).
278. H.R. REP. No. 63, supra note 1, at 26 (minority views) (relying on March
1994 report of National Center for State Courts).
279. Id. Notably, on a national basis, state tort actions have decreased since
1990. Id.
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ity actions casts substantial doubt on the need for products liability
reform and has been described as "[a] bullet in the head of prod-
ucts liability reform. s280 Their more recent study confirms that the
need for products liability reform is questionable in light of declin-
ing real dollar awards and declining plaintiff success rates.281 The
trends they describe, which minimize the need for products liability
reform, are national in scope and contrast sharply with percep-
tion.282 Though comprehensive nationally based products liability
reform is necessary to provide uniformity,283 appropriate modifica-
tion to the law and to discourage the bringing of frivolous actions,
an understanding of the data compels the conclusion that such re-
form does not require a statute of repose.
A national products liability statute of repose is justified only if
it will realistically limit the number of products liability claims filed
or somehow reduce the amount of successful litigation. Only such
results would justify the various findings and objectives contained in
the Product Liability Fairness Act. As previously noted, the number
of cases potentially affected by such a statute are minimal and there
is no indication of any recent substantial rise in products liability
litigation. It is now clear that two other factors suggest the absence
of any need for such a statute. First, the percentage of successful
cases filed in both federal and state courts has steadily declined.
Second, median pretrial awards have shown little steady growth dur-
ing the 1980s. Indeed, within this period some years have shown a
decline in such awards.28 4 Utilizing data provided by the Adminis-
280. Eisenberg & Henderson, supra note 229, at 733 (describing empirical
study in Theodore Eisenberg & James A. Henderson, The Quiet Revolution in Prod-
ucts Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REv. 479 (1990)).
281. Id. at 734.
282. Id.
283. Victor E. Schwartz, on behalf of the Product Liability Alliance and the
Product Liability Coordinating Committee, testified:
In the past dozen years, over a dozen states have passed some form of
product liability legislation. All this legislation is different and it has con-
tinued the Tower of Babel style product liability law we have in the
United States. In spite of arguments to the contrary, product liability in
the United States is not uniform. Nevertheless, products are uniform,
and standards of and for safety should have uniformity.... In the United
States, over 70 percent of goods that are manufactured in a state are
shipped out of the state. For that reason, state product liability legislation
has less than a 30 percent "effectiveness" standard.
Hearings S. 687, supra note 74, at 120-22.
284. Eisenberg & Henderson, supra note 227, at 767. There is evidence of an
uneven increase in trial awards. Id. at 764-66. The extensive data regarding
awards has no direct bearing on the efficacy of a statute of repose, though it has
considerable bearing on the finding of excessive damage awards. H.R. 956, supra
note 2, § 2(a)(3).
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trative Office of the United States Courts and a review of published
state and federal decisions, empirical evaluation establishes that
plaintiffs' success rates in published opinions have declined from
56% in 1979 to 39% in 1989 and fell 24% at the federal district
court level during the same time frame.2 85 Comparing the data to
states with and without effective repose statutes reveals no meaning-
ful difference.28 6
This national trend cuts across most product types. The suc-
cess rate decline has affected claims focused on such key products
as industrial machinery, automobiles and construction equip-
ment.2 87 Of the twenty-one major product categories specified,
only four showed an increase in successful actions. Of these four,
only two, toxic substances and tools, are substantial. 288
The disparate elements necessary for ascertaining the need for
a statute of repose all suggest that no rational basis for its creation
exists. The scope of the proposed statute is highly limited and will
have no effect on core areas of litigation such as asbestos and
Bendectin. The number of products and potential products related
claims precluded by the act is so insignificant as to have no mean-
ingful effect on insurance availability or rate setting. The insurance
crisis was largely attributable to causes outside of actual case history
and has abated. The litigation explosion is primarily attributable to
increases in commercial and entitlement litigation. Plaintiffs are
facing a nationally observable reduction in successful litigation.
Lyrics from a well known rock musical put the need for such action
285. Eisenberg & Henderson, supra note 227, at 741. From 1985-89, plain-
tiffs' success rate has declined in 36 states while increasing in only 13. The decline
includes many states with major populations and does not show a skewed or aber-
rant result based on a single state experience. Id. at 773. A similar reduction of
plaintiffs' success rate is found in the federal courts. Id.
A twelve month study endingJune 30, 1992 indicates that of 762,000 state civil
cases decided in 75 of this country's most populated counties, only 1504 (2%)
were decided byjuries. Only 360 of these were products liability actions. Plaintiffs'
41% success rate in these actions is remarkably close to the 39% rate found by
Eisenberg and Henderson for 1989. See PROD LIAB. REP. (CCH) No. 837 (July 24,
1995) (summarizing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF STATISTICS, Rpt. No. NCJ-
154346, Civil Jury Cases & Verdicts in Large Counties).
286. Compare the states listed in the Appendix with the data provided by
Eisenberg and Henderson. See Eisenberg & Henderson, supra note 229, at 797,
app. A, tables Al-All.
287. See Eisenberg & Henderson, supra note 227, at 779, 801, app. A & table
A-10.
288. Id. The proposed national repose statute would be inapplicable to toxic
substance claims. Judicial outcome is already limiting suits in a manner consistent
with the legislative objective.
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into focus: "What's the buzz? Tell me what's a happening."28 9
2. The International Competitiveness Canard
The assertion that products liability law undermines America's
ability to compete in the international market is stated as a congres-
sional finding.2 90 This finding, though subject to debate, is based
on facts sufficient to support the need for national legislation. 291 It
is, however, inadequate to provide a rational basis for concluding
that a national statute of repose will lead to improved international
competitiveness. Inasmuch as the proposed statute of repose is to
be upheld even if it is an "imperfect fit" with congressional objec-
tives, the extent of the fit between international competitiveness
and this specific section of the Act must be explored.
Assertions that products liability law adversely impacts competi-
tiveness are founded on two key factors: (1) the uncertainty in the
litigation process, and (2) the high cost of products liability insur-
ance in the United States.2 92 The litigation process is, by definition,
an uncertain endeavor. The pending Act's provisions dealing with
damage limitations, comparative fault, and an alcohol and drug de-
fense will, over time, provide some degree of uniformity and pre-
dictability as courts interpret and apply these terms. The proposed
statute of repose will have little or no impact on uniformity, predict-
ability or insurance costs.
Related to these factors is the capacity of American courts to
assert jurisdiction over foreign companies whose products cause in-
jury in the United States. Unless jurisdiction can be gained, foreign
competitors will receive a highly favorable cost advantage. Through
the early 1970s, courts failed to exercise the full scope of in per-
sonama jurisdiction available to them thereby insulating foreign
manufacturers from suit in the United States.293 Foreign manufac-
289. ANDREW LLOYD WEBBER & TIM RICE, What's the Buzz/Strange Things Mystify-
ing, on JESUS CHRIST SUPERSTAR LIBRErro (Leeds Music Ltd. 1969).
290. H.R. 956, supra note 2, § 2(a)(7).
291. See S. REP. No. 69, supra note 4, at 69-73 (1995) (minority views of Sen.
Hollings); see also Gary T. Schwartz, Product Liability and Medical Malpractice in Com-
parative Context, in THE LIABILITY MAZE 28 (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds.,
1991) (providing comprehensive discussion of foreign law, with some comparative
effects).
292. S. REP. No. 203, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., at 12-13 (1994).
293. See, e.g., Harvey v. Chemie Grunenthal, G.m.b.H., 354 F.2d 428 (2d Cir.
1965) (holding that German manufacturer of thalidomide whose product sold in
Germany, but used in New York, was not subject to jurisdiction), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 1001 (1966); Delagi v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 278 N.E.2d 895 (N.Y. 1972) (hold-
ing that New York domiciliary injured in Germany allegedly due to defective auto-
mobile purchased in Germany cannot sue manufacturer in United States); cf.
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turers were adept at creating United States subsidiary importers to
insulate the parent company from suit thereby gaining litigation
and marketing advantages that lowered their cost of doing business
in comparison to domestic companies. 294 Foreign companies were
further advantaged by a favorable exchange rate that made it ad-
vantageous to market in the United States while raising the price of
American products marketed abroad. These factors no longer
exist.
The Yen, for example, is vastly stronger today and, absent unre-
lated Japanese trade practices, 295 the exchange rate would en-
courage marketing of American products. Moreover, foreign
manufacturers are normally subject to jurisdiction in the United
States consistent with the broad reach of modem long-arm service
statutes and a liberal application of what was once a restrictively
interpreted minimum contacts doctrine.2 96
Foreign manufacturers subject to American jurisdiction are
subject to American law. They are treated and judged, consistent
with local substantive law, like any domestic company. Litigation
and transaction costs of doing business in the United States, insofar
as they relate to products liability, are the same regardless of the
home nation of the product manufacturer. These costs apply with
Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 227 N.E.2d 851 (N.Y. 1967) (holding that
New York resident injured at hotel in England could bring suit in New York).
294. Perhaps the leading case as to the inability of a plaintiff to reach the
parent of an independent subsidiary is Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co.,
267 U.S. 333 (1925). The distinct roles created difficulties in the discovery process
when manufacturer's research and development or quality control records were
sought and also protected the foreign company's assets. Id.
295. For example, automobile dealership practices are partially responsible
for the fact that America's Big Three automotive manufacturers have achieved
only a 1% market in Japan while Japanese manufacturers enjoy a 23% market
share in the United States. See Paul Blustein & Warren Brown, In Doing Business, A
Deal of Difference; Contrasts in U.S., Japanese Sales Alliances Shed Light on Automotive
Trade Dispute, WASH. PosT, June 6, 1995.
296. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), established
the need for minimum contacts with a state in order to assert in personamjurisdic-
tion over foreign corporations to comport with due process in the interest of
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Id. at 316. Jurisdictional
outer parameters were established in Asahi Metal Industries Co. v. Superior Court,
480 U.S. 102 (1987), a case arising out of a dispute between Japanese companies.
Absent such aberrational facts, exercising jurisdiction over foreign companies in
American courts is readily accomplished. See, e.g., Tobin v. Astra Pharmaceutical
Prods., Inc., 993 F.2d 528 (6th Cir. 1993) (involving Dutch drug manufacturer);
Stokes v. L. Geismar, S.A., 815 F. Supp. 904 (E.D. Va. 1993) (involving French
manufacturer of rail cutting saw), aff'd without opinion, 16 F.3d 411 (4th Cir. 1994);
Newport Components, Inc. v. NEC Home Elecs., 671 F. Supp. 1525 (C.D. Cal.
1987) (involving Japanese manufacturer of electronic products); see also H.R. 956,
supra note 2, § 107 (addressing jurisdiction over foreign companies in manner
consistent with due process).
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equal force to all manufacturers and all equally benefit from a stat-
ute of repose.
Two areas in which jurisdiction determinations relate to choice
of law issues require further explication. The first is where an
American manufacturer is subjected to the jurisdiction of a foreign
nation whose choice of law rules lead to application of American
law when its own companies, in identical situations, could be sub-
ject to more business oriented domestic law. This possibility cannot
be dismissed even though its extent is unknown. Paradoxically, for-
eign application of the proposed statute of repose would be detri-
mental to American competitiveness. Application of the American
repose provision, with at least a fifteen year time frame and its vari-
ous built in exceptions, could often replace a far more stringent
foreign statute that would preclude many more actions. The re-
pose statute contained in the European Directive relied upon by
Congress 297 contains a blanket ten year limitation period.
Congress can rejoice in the fact that a federal repose statute
would most likely be deemed inapplicable in foreign forums
thereby aiding American competitive ability.298 Passage of such a
provision would potentially confuse the issue and allow foreign
courts, at least those within the European Community, to expand
the liability of American companies by applying the American re-
pose statute to them while continuing to protect domestic compa-
nies through application of a more stringent local statute of repose.
Application of the proposed American repose statute will be injuri-
ous, not advantageous.
The second choice of law related situation that could yield a
competitive disadvantage occurs when a product related injury
takes place in a foreign nation and the injured party brings suit in
the United States against an American manufacturer seeking appli-
cation of American law.299 As noted by the Senate: "[t]he dimin-
297. H.R. REP. No. 63, supra note 1, at 10-11.
298. For example, French and German courts characterize statutes of limita-
tion as substantive for choice of law purposes. 1 ERNEST RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF
LAws, A COMPARATIVE STUDY 70 (2d ed. 1958). In civil law nations, the principle of
the place of the wrong as governing the rights of the parties extends to limitations
upon the time for bringing the action as part of the substantive law. Id. at 294.
Thus, most of the nations which comprise the European Community would apply
the Community's own Directive as to repose, set forth infra note 312, rather than
the American statute of repose. The same result follows for nations that view limi-
tation statutes as procedural unless deemed a part of the substantive right. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 142-143 (1969).
299. It is unlikely, though not impossible, for a foreign national injured in a
foreign nation by an American manufactured product to succeed in gaining the
benefit of American law if suit was brought in the United States. Such forum shop-
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ished importance of lex loci means U.S. manufacturers may be held
to higher and more costly product liability standards in both U.S.
and foreign markets while foreign competitors only confront U.S.
law in the United States."300 The Senate fails to recognize that
United States companies, whose acts or products cause injury in for-
eign nations, may obtain dismissal of actions filed against them in
the United States based on forum non conveniens. Such a dismissal,
with suit now to be filed in the foreign nation, could then be con-
trolled by the local law of the foreign forum thereby providing a
benefit to the American company.301 As a forum non conveniens mo-
tion may be denied, this argument remains sufficient to justify a
national products liability act that reduces the cost of such actions.
The argument has no significant bearing on the validity of a statute
of repose as, once again, the statute applies to all with equal force.
Moreover, the statute of repose will have a de minimis effect on
foreign manufacturers as the number of foreign products coming
within its purview will be highly limited.
The underlying question is whether products liability reform is
an appropriate means to improve American competitiveness or
whether improvement can better be made through addressing the
wide variety of other factors that bear on international competitive-
ness. The Committee Reports argue that products liability reform
is an appropriate means to this end.302
The Senate focuses largely on insurance cost differentials that
have no true relationship to the statute of repose. 303 For example,
ping is inconsistent with the interest analysis approach to choice of law which has
replaced lex loci as the focal point. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAws § 145 (1969).
300. S. REP. No. 69, supra note 4, at 11. The Report further indicates that this
problem is compounded by the inability of the United States to gain treaty protec-
don and notes that this scenario actually occurred when the law of the District of
Columbia was applied to an American manufacturer for an injury which occurred
in Vietnam. Id. (referring to Pray v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 644 F. Supp. 1289
(D.D.C. 1986)).
301. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 238 (1981) (dismissing
action on ground of forum non conveniens "[alfter noting that an alternative forum
existed in Scotland" and concluding that the "possibility of an unfavorable change
in law [to the plaintiff] should not, by itself, bar the dismissal"); In re Union Car-
bide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842, 846-47, 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (dis-
missing action on grounds of forum non conveniens even though law in alternative
forum may be less favorable to plaintiff), modified and aff'd, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir.),
and cert. denied, 484 U.S. 871 (1987).
302. H.R. REP. No. 63, supra note 1, at 10; S. REP. No. 69, supra note 4, at 10.
303. The Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation re-
lies extensively on a comparison of insurance costs paid by foreign companies ver-
sus those paid by American companies including the absence of any discount rate
for American companies that market abroad. S. REP. No. 69, supra note 4, at 10.
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the Senate's claim of an insurance cost differential is significantly
based on a 1982 study finding that "the price of imported products
can be lower due to the difference in liability insurance rates, if the
importer does not sell all of its products in the United States."30 4
This reliance is misplaced. First, it implicitly suggests that foreign
companies would gain less protection from a statute of repose than
would American manufacturers as fewer of its products would be
targeted in products liability litigation. Second, since 1982, there
has been a substantial influx of foreign products into the United
States.305 This influx will influence foreign companies' insurance
rates as the number of litigation occurrences will rise.306 Additional
factors, relied upon by the House Committee, require further
analysis.
The House Report on the Common Sense Product Liability Re-
form Act argues that American companies face a "patchwork of lia-
bility standards" that inhibit their ability to compete. 30 7 It is
asserted that foreign competitors face no such handicap in. their
own domestic markets due to uniform products liability regulations
found in both the European Community and in Japan.308 There is,
unquestionably, a significant degree of uniformity in products lia-
bility law among the nations that comprise America's major trading
Although the data relied upon is outdated as to marketing and liability changes,
and subject to question in terms of how rates are set, the underlying position has
sufficient validity for purposes of application of a rational basis test in regard to
overall national legislation.
304. Id.
305. American manufacturers witnessed a drop in their market share from
84% in 1978 to 68% in 1989 due, in part, to an estimated $500 per vehicle cost
savings derived from Japanese labor costs. S.C. Gwynne, Running Low on Gas: Slow
Car Sales and New Japanese "Transplants" Bring Harder Times for Detroit's Automakers,
TIME, Nov. 20, 1989, at 70, 71. By 1990, Japanese automobile imports comprised a
27.7% market share reflecting sales of some 2.7 million automobiles compared to
a 19.6% share in 1980. S.C. Gwynne, The Right Stuff. Does the U.S. Industry Have It?
With Teamwork and New Ideas, GM's Saturn Aims to Show That American Manufacturers
Can Come Roaring Back, TIME, Oct. 29, 1990, at 74, 75. Similarly, consumer elec-
tronics imports had a mere 5.6% market share in 1960, but a 68% share in 1986.
Jack Beatty, The Middle Class Crisis, S.F. CHRON., May 29, 1994, at 6Z-1.
To my personal knowledge, a single German automobile manufacturer was a
target defendant in over 200 products liability suits at any given time between 1967
and 1970. The number of imported products currently in the United States and
which have been in the United States for years, guarantees that foreign companies
will face a substantial number of products liability claims governed by American
law with a commensurate effect upon their insurance rates.
306. Although some intangible factors affect insurance rate setting, it is well
recognized that the primary factor is the occurrence rate. See McGovern, supra,
note 5, at 593; note 183 and accompanying text; and text accompanying note 190.
307. H.R. REP. No. 63, supra note 1, at 10.
308. Id. at 10-11.
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partners. The House Report delineates six factors that create this
handicap:30 9 (1) a unified definition of defect; (2) a complete de-
fense for products which meet mandatory regulations set by public
authority; (3) limitation on non-economic damages; (4) punitive
damages are largely unknown; (5) a limit on liability based on
known technical knowledge (state of the art defense); and (6) a ten
year statute of repose. 310
The pending legislation provides no unitary definition of de-
fect or general liability standard nor does it create a government
regulation compliance defense or address a state of the art defense.
It does address both damages aspects and will have a salutary effect
in this area. Within this limit, the proposed national Act will ad-
dress imbalances that deter American competitiveness in the inter-
national arena.311 This has no bearing upon, and is not true of, the
statute of repose.
The proposed statute of repose is substantially longer than,
and contains exceptions that are not found in, the foreign statute
relied upon by the Committee.3 12 Even assuming some benefit
from a statute of repose, it takes little thought to recognize that a
stiff ten year provision will have far more effect than a muddled
fifteen or twenty year provision. This flaw exists without regard to
the dangers the statute presents for resolution of choice of law
issues.
309. Id.
310. Id. The minority view strongly suggests that the benefits relied upon by
the House Committee majority are exaggerated. S. REP. No. 69, supra note 4, at
71-72 (minority views of Sen. Hollings).
311. The sufficiency of some facts relied upon in the House outweigh the lack
of completeness and currency of data for provisions other than the statute of re-
pose. The repose data are insufficient. For example, there is no support for the
claim of a twenty-fold differential in insurance costs. There is also no specification
of the impact such costs have on pricing nor any significant indicator of whether
this small aspect of total production cost will have an adverse effect on marketing
capacity. See H.R. REP. No. 63, supra note 1, at 10-11.
312. Ferdinado Albanese & Louis F. Del Duca, Developments in European Prod-
uct Liability, 5 DicK. J. INT'L L. 193, 242 (1987). Article 10 of The European Com-
munity Directive of July 25, 1985 provides for a three year statute of limitations
modified by a discovery rule. Id. Article 10, however, is limited by the repose
provision of Article 11 that provides:
Member States shall provide in their legislation that the rights conferred
upon the injured person pursuant to this Directive shall be extinguished
upon the expiry of a period of 10 years from the date on which the pro-
ducer put into circulation the actual product which caused the damage,
unless the injured person has in the meantime instituted proceedings
against the producer.
Id. The Directive operates "without exceptions." Hearings S. 687, supra note 74, at
44 (testimony of Victor E. Schwartz).
1051
HeinOnline  -- 40 Vill. L. Rev. 1051 1995
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Far more important than the limited role played by products
liability law upon international competitiveness are the more signif-
icant reasons for failure of American competitiveness that lie else-
where and require a vastly different solution. A statute of repose
does not represent a step by step approach to the resolution of in-
ternational competitiveness issues. Products liability claims do not
inhibit American capacity to compete in the international market-
place. The statute represents a misstep.
As noted by the Office of Technology Assessment in 1990, the
four most important steps necessary to improve competitiveness
are: (1) lowering the cost of capital; (2) improving the quality of
human resources through education and quality of the workforce;
(3) improving the diffusion of manufacturing technology to small
and medium businesses; and (4) providing government funding for
research and development.313 To truly enhance American competi-
tiveness our focus must turn to these and other factors.3 14
These approaches would be vastly more effective in increasing
American competitiveness than any products liability legislation.
Products liability litigation plays a minor role in this complex arena.
The proposed statute of repose plays virtually no role in this matrix
and cannot be justified as a means to enhance American interna-
tional competitiveness.
III. CONCLUSION
Statutes of repose will have no more than a negligible effect
upon manufacturers' ability to obtain insurance coverage at afford-
able rates. Such statutes will have virtually no impact on the
number of tort actions filed in the United States and represent only
a few grains of sand in the beach of products liability actions.
There is no rational basis for the imposition of a fifteen year na-
tional products liability statute of repose. True products liability
reform would obviate the need for such statutes by providing the
substantive protection truly needed by American industry.
313. S. REP. No. 69, supra note 4, at 69 (minority views of Sen. Hollings). This
view also attacks the foundations of various cost claims, the relationship between
products liability law and competitiveness and other premises. Id. It, nevertheless,
fails to establish a challenge sufficient to invalidate the overall Act.
314. Such factors include negotiation of fair trade agreements, tariffs or other
steps to increase the cost of goods manufactured through the use of child or sweat-
shop labor in foreign nations, retention of valid product and workplace safety reg-
ulation while reviewing and discarding those regulations which are ineffective in
their ability to protect consumers and workers, creation of tax laws which en-
courage research and development and passage of a complete national products
liability reform act.
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IV. APPENDIX
PRODUCTS LiABILITy STATUTES OF REPOSE
AND THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY
A. EXISTING STATUTES:
State Repose Provision
ALA. CODE § 6-5-502 (1993)
(ten years)
ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-551
(1995) (twelve years)
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
107(1)(b) (West 1987)
years)
§ 13-80-
(seven
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-577(a)
(1991) (ten years)
GA. CODE. ANN. § 51-1-11(b) (2)
(1982) (ten years)
IDAHO CODE § 6-1403(2) (1995)
(ten years)
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735, para.
13-213 (Smith-Hurd 1992)
(ten/twelve years)
IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5-5
(West 1983) (ten years)
Constitutional Validity
Invalid. Lankford v. Sullivan,
Long & Hagerty, 416 So. 2d
996 (Ala. 1982).
Invalid. Hazine v. Montgomery
Elevator Co., 861 P.2d 625
(Ariz. 1993), overruling Bryant v.
Continental Conveyor & Equip.
Co., 751 P.2d 509 (Ariz. 1988).
Valid. Eaton v. Jarvis Prods.
Corp., 965 F.2d 922 (10th Cir.
1992); Anderson v. M.W.
Kellogg Co., 766 P.2d 637
(Colo. 1988) (en banc).
Valid. Arsenault v. Pa-Ted
Spring Co., 523 A.2d 1283
(Conn. 1987); Daily v. New
Britain Mach. Co., 512 A.2d
893 (Conn. 1986).
Valid. Love v. Whirlpool Corp.,
449 S.E.2d 602 (Ga. 1994).
Valid. Olsen v. J.A. Freeman
Co., 791 P.2d 1285 (Idaho
1990).
Valid by implication as was
interpreted in Thompson v.
Walters, 565 N.E.2d 1385 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1991); see also Costello
v. Unarco Indus., 473 N.E.2d
96 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
Valid. Alexander v. Beech
Aircraft, 952 F.2d 1215 (10th
Cir. 1991).
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KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3303
(1994) (ten years)
NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-224(2)
(Reissue 1989) (ten years)
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507-
D:2 (1983) (twelve years)
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-50(6)
(1994) (six years)
N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.1-
02(1) (1991), as amended, Laws
1995, ch. 305 (ten/eleven
years). § 28-01.1-02(1) was
replaced by 28-01.3-08
OR. REv. STAT. § 30.905(1)
(1987) (eight years)
R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-1-13(b)
(1976) (ten years)
Valid by implication as section
was interpreted in Bauman v.
Excel Indus., 845 P.2d 65 (Kan.
Ct. App. 1993).
Valid. Spilker v. City of
Lincoln, 469 N.W.2d 546 (Neb.
1991).
Invalid. Heath v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 464 A.2d 288
(N.H. 1983).
Valid. Tetterton v. Long Mfg.
Co., 332 S.E.2d 67 (N.C. 1985);
Colony Hill Condominium I
Ass'n v. Colony Co., 320 S.E.2d
273 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984), cert.
denied, 325 S.E.2d 485 (N.C.
1985).
The N.D. Supreme Court has
invalidated the repose provision
of the Wrongful Death Act, but
upheld the repose provision
relating to real property.
Compare Vantage, Inc. v. Carrier
Corp., 467 N.W.2d 446 (N.D.
1991) with Bellemare v.
Gateway Builders, Inc., 420
N.W.2d 733 (N.D. 1988).
Valid. Sealey v. Hicks, 788 P.2d
435 (Or. 1990); Marinelli v.
Ford Motor Co., 696 P.2d 1
(Or. Ct. App.), review denied,
701 P.2d 785 (Or. 1985). A
predecessor statute was upheld
in Johnson v. Star Mach. Co.,
530 P.2d 53 (Or. 1974) (en
banc).
Invalid. Kennedy v.
Cumberland Eng'g Co., 471
A.2d 195 (R.I. 1984).
1054 [Vol. 40: p. 985
HeinOnline  -- 40 Vill. L. Rev. 1054 1995
1995] CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION OF REPOSE STATUTES
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-103
(1980) (ten years)
TEX. CIV. PRAc. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 16.012(2)(b) (West
1996) (fifteen years)
B. REPEALED STATUTES:
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.031 (2)
(twelve years), repealed by, 1986
FLA. LAws ch. 272
S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 15-2-12.1
(six years), repealed by, S.L.
1985, ch. 157, § 2
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-3 (ten
years), repealed by, 1989 Utah
Laws ch. 119 § 1
Valid. Kochins v. Linden-
Alimak, Inc., 799 F.2d 1128
(6th Cir. 1986); Jones v. Five
Star Eng'g, Inc., 717 S.W.2d
882 (Tenn. 1986).
Valid oby implication as the real
property improvement
provision has been applied in
several cases. See, e.g., Trinity
River Auth. v. URS Consultants,
Inc.-Texas f/k/a URS/Forrest
and Cotton, Inc., 889 S.W.2d
259 (Tex. 1994); Karisch v.
Allied-Signal, Inc., 837 S.W.2d
679 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
Previously held valid. Eddings
v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 835
F.2d 1369 (11th Cir. 1988);
Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc., 476
So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1985). The
repeal was held non-retroactive.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Acosta, 612 So. 2d 1361 (Fla.
1992).
Previously held invalid.
Daugaard v. Baltic Coop. Bldg.
Supply Ass'n, 349 N.W.2d 419
(S.D. 1984).
Previously held invalid. Berry v.
Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d
670 (Utah 1985); followed
Raithaus v. Saab-Scandia of
Am., Inc., 784 P.2d 1158 (Utah
1989).
This appendix does not include reference to the array of
other, often related, repose provisions such as those governing
products utilized in the improvement of real property, statutes di-
rected to discrete products such as Agent Orange, product groups
such as herbicides or provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code.
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Various exceptions and special provisions found within given stat-
utes are also excluded.
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